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DISENTANGLING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FROM 
CHILD SEX ABUSE 
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK

 
ABSTRACT 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the criminal 
penalties associated with possession of child pornography. The new 
severity appears to be premised on arguments that blur the distinction 
between those who possess images of child pornography and those who 
sexually abuse children. In particular, sentences have been increased 
based on arguments that possession of pornography is equivalent to or 
worse than child sex abuse, arguments that viewing child pornography 
increases the risk that an individual will sexually abuse a child, and 
arguments that those who possess child pornography are abusing children 
undetected. This Article identifies instances where possession of child 
pornography and child sex abuse have been conflated, critically evaluates 
the arguments that promote such conflation, and identifies independent 
concerns with conflation. Specifically, it argues that blurring the 
distinction between the two crimes allows us to continue to misperceive 
child sex abuse as a stranger-danger issue and that when law enforcement 
statistics aggregate possession and child sex abuse, the public may be 
misled into believing that law enforcement is successfully battling child 
sex abuse. The Article concludes that the modern trend of increasing 
sentences for possession of child pornography ought to be reviewed, and it 
suggests several possible areas of reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Child pornography was first identified as a serious problem in the 
1970s. Due to aggressive law enforcement, the widespread distribution of 
child pornography had essentially ceased by the late 1980s.
1
 But the birth 
of the Internet and other technological advances, such as digital 
photography, led to a dramatic increase in the availability of child 
pornography and rendered obsolete past enforcement techniques for 
detecting child pornography.
2
 
 
 
 1. See IAN O‘DONNELL & CLAIRE MILNER, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: CRIME, COMPUTERS & 
SOCIETY 20 (2007); Child Pornography, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ 
ceos/childporn.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (―By the mid-1980‘s [sic], the trafficking of child 
pornography within the United States had been almost completely eradicated through a series of 
successful campaigns waged by law enforcement.‖). 
 2. O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 28. The full extent of the Internet child pornography 
problem is a matter of some dispute. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H10,241, H10,250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
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The legislative response to the modern increase in child pornography 
has been uniformly draconian. State and federal governments have 
drastically increased the criminal penalties for possession of child 
pornography. The rhetoric surrounding the increased sentences suggests 
that this new severity is tied to a perception that those who possess child 
pornography are indistinguishable from those who actually abuse children. 
This rhetoric takes several forms. Some argue that penalties for possession 
of child pornography should be increased because it is a crime that is 
equivalent to, or worse than, the act of sexually abusing a child. Others 
contend that possession of child pornography must be punished severely 
because possession creates an increased risk that an individual will 
sexually abuse children. And still others seem to treat prosecutions for 
possession of child pornography as a proxy for prosecuting those who 
sexually abuse children; in other words, because those who possess child 
pornography are assumed also to sexually abuse children, the punishment 
for child pornography possession ought to be calibrated to punish child sex 
abuse as opposed to merely possession of child pornography.  
This Article questions the new severity in punishing possession of child 
pornography. It is critical of those who seek to blur the line between the 
possession of child pornography and child sex abuse, noting that such 
blurring is inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness and justice, 
and it is unsupported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, the Article 
identifies independent concerns with such blurring. Focusing on child 
pornography allows us to ignore the messy and tragic reality of child sex 
abuse—namely, that the majority of these crimes are committed by those 
who know and care for the child they are abusing rather than by strangers. 
In addition to the fact that the child pornography discussion allows us to 
continue to misperceive child sex abuse as a stranger-danger issue, when 
 
 
2008) (statement of Rep. Barton) (asserting that congressional investigations revealed that ―three 
million images of child pornography were on the Internet‖); Julian Sher & Benedict Carey, Federal 
Study Stirs Debate on Child Pornography‟s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, at A20 
(reporting number of eight million images from the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children); see also O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 79 (―Attempts to tally the number of child 
pornography enthusiasts are as pointless as the guesstimates of the numbers of victims and images in 
circulation. The illegal nature of every aspect of this trade leaves few individuals willing to admit their 
involvement. Such is the revulsion which child pornography usually invokes it is a rare individual who 
would admit to even viewing this material.‖); KERRY SHELDON & DENNIS HOWITT, SEX OFFENDERS 
AND THE INTERNET 23 (2007) (―It is generally difficult to know the prevalence of child pornographic 
images including those circulating on the Internet and, in some cases, it is not clear how available 
statistics are obtained or even what they mean. . . . Reliable assessments of the amount of child 
pornography on the Internet are difficult. The Internet is too large and changes too quickly to sample 
meaningfully or reliably and it is difficult to know what an appropriate sampling frame from which to 
draw samples would be.‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
856 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:853 
 
 
 
 
possession is conflated with actual child sex abuse, the public may be 
misled into believing that law enforcement is successfully detecting and 
prosecuting child sex abuse when that is not the case. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I maps the modern trend of 
increasing sentences for those convicted of possessing child pornography. 
Part II identifies how those increases are tied to rhetoric that blurs the line 
between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse, and it 
critically evaluates the reasoning in that rhetoric. Part III discusses how 
blurring the line between possession and child sex abuse perpetuates 
misperceptions regarding both the personal relationships involved in child 
sex abuse and the effectiveness of law enforcement in combating such 
abuse. Part IV offers some tentative legislative and judicial solutions to 
reform the sentencing of child pornography offenders. 
I. THE MODERN TREND OF INCREASED SENTENCES 
In contrast with the constitutional protections that ensure the right of 
individuals to possess images of adult pornography, states are permitted to 
criminalize the private possession of child pornography. Ordinarily, the 
First Amendment protects sexually explicit speech and images unless they 
are ―obscene,‖3 and the private possession of pornographic images, even if 
obscene, is also protected.
4
 But in New York v. Ferber,
5
 the Supreme Court 
held that the distribution and sale of even nonobscene child pornography 
could be criminalized. And in Osborne v. Ohio,
6
 the Court upheld criminal 
sanctions for the private possession of child pornography. The Court 
justified these departures from its First Amendment jurisprudence on the 
grounds that images of child pornography are the product of child sex 
abuse, that the state has an important interest in protecting the victims of 
child sex abuse, and that reducing demand for child pornography (by 
prosecuting possessors) could thus reduce the instances of child sex 
abuse.
7
 Because Ferber and Osborne held that the First Amendment does 
not protect possession of child pornography, states are free to criminalize 
it. And because the Supreme Court has essentially abdicated judicial 
review of length of sentence claims under the Eighth Amendment,
8
 states 
 
 
 3. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Amy Adler, Inverting the First 
Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 929 (2001). 
 4. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 5. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 6. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 7. See id. at 108–10; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759–60, 761.  
 8. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
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can increase the penalties for possessing child pornography up to life in 
prison without running afoul of the Constitution. 
Since Osborne was decided in 1990, legislatures have significantly 
increased the sentences for possession of child pornography. For example, 
in 1990, federal law punished the possession of child pornography by up 
to ten years of imprisonment.
9
 In 1996, the maximum penalty was 
increased to fifteen years of imprisonment.
10
 A mandatory minimum five-
year sentence was added, and the statutory maximum sentence was raised 
from fifteen to twenty years in 2003.
11
  
States have also significantly increased their penalties. All fifty states 
have specific provisions criminalizing the possession of child 
pornography, and thirty states have increased the penalties available for 
possession of child pornography since criminalizing it.
12
 The pattern of 
 
 
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1156, 1160–61 (2009) (noting that ―the Court has been steadfast in its refusal to 
police disproportionate sentences outside the capital context‖ and that the Court‘s modern length of 
sentence cases ―make clear that ‗proportionality has become virtually meaningless as a constitutional 
principle‘‖ (quoting Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 695 (2005))). 
 9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1990). 
 10. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(5), 110 Stat. 
3009-26, 3009-30, invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 11. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 103(a)(1)(B)(i), 117 Stat. 650, 652 (2003) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)). The maximum penalty was increased from fifteen to 
twenty years for ―receiving‖ child pornography. The legislation also increased the maximum penalty 
for possession from five to ten years. PROTECT Act § 103(a)(1)(C)(i). As discussed below, because 
receipt is a necessary component for possession, it is the twenty-year maximum penalty that represents 
the true exposure for offenders who possess child pornography. See infra note 38 and text 
accompanying note 174. 
 12. S. 53, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-
6(a)(5), 15-20-21(5) (2005)) (adding a special provision in 2005 imposing a ten-year mandatory 
minimum on any offender convicted of a Class B felony involving child pornography); S. 56, 24th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(h)(4) (2009)) 
(increasing maximum term of imprisonment from ten years to ninety-nine years); S. 1128, 2006 Leg., 
2005–2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (West 
2007)) (reclassifying possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); H.R. 06-1092, 65th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403(5) (2009)) 
(reclassifying possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); S. 1458, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Reg. 
Sess. (Conn. 2007) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196a (2007)) (adding mandatory minimum 
sentences); H.R. 740, 139th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 1998) (codified as amended at DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (2000)) (reclassifying possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); S. 1004, 
20th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0847 (West 2007)) (providing 
for higher penalties based on the number and content of the images possessed); H.R. 462, 2003 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (2003)) (reclassifying 
possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); S. 1312, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006) (codified 
at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507A (2006)) (increasing maximum penalty from five to ten years‘ 
imprisonment); S. 697, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008) (codified as amended at 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.3 (2010)) (creating a new offense of ―aggravated child pornography,‖ if the 
images possessed depict a child under the age of thirteen); H.R. 1010, 112th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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increasing penalties appears to be getting stronger, as twenty-eight of 
those increases have occurred since 2000,
13
 nineteen have occurred since 
 
 
Sess. (Ind. 2002) (codified as amended at IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (2007)) (reclassifying possession 
from a misdemeanor to a felony); H.R. 327, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2001) (codified as 
amended at IOWA CODE § 728.12 (2003)) (reclassifying possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); 
H.R. 3, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.335 (West 
2006)) (reclassifying possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); H.R. 5296, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2002) (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145c(4) (2004)) (reclassifying 
possession from a misdemeanor to a felony); S. 969, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2001) (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 617.247(4) (2006)) (increasing the maximum penalty from three to five 
years‘ imprisonment); H.R. 1058, S. 2864, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (codified at MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-5-35 (2005)) (increasing the statutory penalty range from two to twenty years‘ 
imprisonment to five to forty years‘ imprisonment); S. 714, 933, 899 & 758, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 573.037 (2009)) (reclassifying from 
a Class D felony to a Class C felony); H.R. 161, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (codified as 
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625(2)(c) (2009)) (increasing maximum penalty from six 
months to ten years‘ imprisonment); Leg. 943, 98th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2004) (codified as amended 
at NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.05 (2009)) (reclassifying from a Class IV felony to a Class IIIA felony); 
S. 341, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730(2) (2005)) (raising 
the maximum penalty for subsequent offenses from ten years to life imprisonment); H.R. 933, S. 132, 
2008 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2008) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17A (2008)) 
(reclassifying from a Class I felony to a Class H felony); H.R. 1357, 60th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(N.D. 2007) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (2007)) (reclassifying from a Class A 
misdemeanor to a Class C felony); S. 2, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995) (codified as 
amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323 (West 2008)) (reclassifying possession from a 
misdemeanor to a felony); S. 834, 185th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002) (codified as amended at 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d) (2009)) (adding provision providing for higher classification of 
subsequent offenses); H.R. 4451, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2004) (codified as amended at 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-410 (2008)) (increasing maximum penalty from five to ten years‘ 
imprisonment); S. 2102, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-17-1003(d) (2005)) (reclassifying the offense from a Class E felony to a Class B, C, or D felony, 
depending on the number of images); H.R. 2335, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1989) (codified as 
amended at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (West 2009)) (reclassifying offense from a misdemeanor 
to a felony in the third degree); H.R. 60, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2000) (codified as amended at 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3(3) (2009)) (adding provision that treats each image and each child 
depicted as a separate offense); H.D. 2457, S. 1153, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) 
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1 (2009)) (reclassifying offense from a Class 1 
misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony); S. 6172, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.68A.070 (2006)) (reclassifying offense from a Class C felony to a Class B felony); 
Assemb. 942, 2005 S. & Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Wis. 2006) (codified at WIS. STAT. § 948.12(3)(a) 
(2006)) (reclassifying offense from a Class I felony to a Class D felony); S. 104, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Wyo. 2007) (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-303(e) (2007)) (adding seven-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for subsequent offenses). 
 13. S. 53, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-6(a)(5), 15-
20-21(5) (2005)); S. 56, 24th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (codified as amended at ALASKA 
STAT. § 12.55.125(h)(4) (2009)); S. 1128, 2006 Leg., 2005–2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified as 
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (West 2007)); H.R. 06-1092, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403(5) (2009)); S. 1458, 2007 
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196a (2007)); S. 
1004, 20th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0847 (West 2007)); 
H.R. 462, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 
(2003)); S. 1312, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006) (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507A 
(2006)); S. 697, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008) (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
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2005,
14
 and four states have increased the penalties associated with 
possession of child pornography multiple times in the last twenty years.
15
 
 
 
STAT. 5/11-20.3 (2010)); H.R. 1010, 112th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2002) (codified as 
amended at IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (2007)); H.R. 327, 79th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2001) 
(codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 728.12 (2003)); H.R. 3, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 
2006) (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.335 (West 2006)); H.R. 5296, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2002) (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145c(4) (2004)); S. 969, 82d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2001) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 617.247(4) (2006)); H.R. 1058, S. 
2864, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-35 (2005)); S. 714, 
933, 899 & 758, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified as amended at MO. REV. 
STAT. § 573.037 (2009)); Leg. 943, 98th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2004) (codified as amended at NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-1463.05 (2009)); S. 341, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (codified at NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 200.730(2) (2005)); H.R. 933, S. 132, 2008 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2008) (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17A (2008)); H.R. 1357, 60th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007) 
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (2007)); S. 834, 185th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2002) (codified as amended at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312(d) (2009)); H.R. 4451, 2004 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2004) (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-410 (2008)); S. 2102, 104th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003(d) (2005)); H.R. 
60, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2000) (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3(3) (2009)); 
H.D. 2457, S. 1153, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1 (2009)); S. 6172, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.68A.070 (2006)); Assemb. 942, 2005 S. & Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Wis. 2006) (codified at 
WIS. STAT. § 948.12(3)(a) (2006)); S. 104, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2007) (codified at WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-4-303(e) (2007)). 
 14. S. 53, 2005 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-6(a)(5), 15-
20-21(5) (2005)); S. 56, 24th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (codified as amended at ALASKA 
STAT. §12.55.125(h)(4) (2009)); S. 1128, 2006 Leg., 2005–2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified as 
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (West 2007)); H.R. 06-1092, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-403(5) (2009)); S. 1458, 2007 
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196a (2007)); S. 
1004, 20th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0847 (West 2007)); S. 
1312, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006) (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507A (2006)); S. 
697, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008) (codified as amended at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-
20.3 (2010)); H.R. 3, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 531.335 (West 2006)); H.R. 1058, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-5-35 (2005)); S. 714, 933, 899 & 758, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified as 
amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 573.037 (2009)); S. 341, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (codified at 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730(2) (2005)); S.L. 2008-117, § 5; H.R. 933, S. 132, 2008 Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Sess. (N.C. 2008) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17A (2008)); H.R. 1357, 60th Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2007) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (2007)); S. 2102, 
104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003(d) (2005)); 
H.D. 2457, S. 1153, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003) (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1 (2009)); S. 6172, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.68A.070 (2006)); Assemb. 942, 2005 S. & Assemb., Biennial Sess. (Wis. 2006) (codified at 
WIS. STAT. § 948.12(3)(a) (2006)); S. 104, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2007) (codified at WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-4-303(e) (2007)). 
 15. Connecticut increased its penalties in 2004 and again in 2007. Prior to 2004, Connecticut had 
only one possession of child pornography offense, which was classified as a Class D felony. See J. 
5043, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2004). Now it distinguishes between three different 
types of possession offenders based on the number of images possessed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
196d (2007) (possessing fifty or more images of child pornography results in minimum five years‘ 
imprisonment); Id. § 53a-196e (possessing between twenty and forty-nine images of child 
pornography results in minimum two years‘ imprisonment); Id. § 53a-196f (possessing fewer than 
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Some of the sentencing increases have been particularly dramatic. For 
example, in 2003, Georgia reclassified possession of child pornography 
from a misdemeanor to a felony, which increased the sentence from no 
more than twelve months in prison to a minimum of five and a maximum 
of twenty years in prison.
16
 Montana increased the maximum penalty for 
possessing child pornography from six months to ten years‘ imprisonment 
in 1995.
17
 And in 2005, Nevada increased the maximum penalty for 
subsequent offenses of child pornography possession from ten years to life 
imprisonment.
18
 
Current sentencing practices for possessors of child pornography 
appear quite severe when viewed in isolation. And they begin to look 
completely disproportionate when viewed in relation to sentences for 
sexual abuse of children. That is because the modern practices have 
resulted in some defendants who possess child pornography receiving 
longer sentences than defendants who sexually abuse children.
19
 One 
 
 
twenty images of child pornography results in minimum one year imprisonment). The mandatory 
minimum sentences for each of the three possession offenses were added in 2007. S. 1458, 2007 Gen. 
Assemb., Jan. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2007). Missouri has twice increased the penalties for child 
pornography possession. It currently classifies possession of child pornography as a Class C felony. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 573.037 (2009). It was reclassified from a Class D felony to a Class C felony in 
2008. See S. 714, 933, 899 & 758, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008). And prior to 2004, 
Missouri classified possession as a Class A misdemeanor. S. 757 & 602, 90th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2000). Virginia has increased its penalties three separate times. It currently classifies 
possession of child pornography as a Class 6 felony for a first offense and a Class 5 felony for 
subsequent offenses. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1:1 (2009). The heightened offense level for a 
subsequent offense was added in 2007. H.R. 2749, S. 1071, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2007). Possession was reclassified from a Class 1 misdemeanor to a Class 6 felony in 2003. H.R. 
2457, S. 1153, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2003). The offense had been reclassified once 
before in 1999 from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class 1 misdemeanor. H.R. 1760, 1999 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1999). Washington increased the penalties twice. It currently classifies 
possession of child pornography as a Class B felony. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.070 (2006). The 
offense was reclassified from a Class C felony to a Class B felony in 2006. S. 6172, 59th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2006). Prior to 1990, possession was classified as a misdemeanor. H.R. 2752, 51st Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1990). 
 16. H.R. 462, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-
100 (2003)). Examples of other dramatic increases include Mississippi, which increased the statutory 
sentencing range for possession of child pornography from two to twenty years to five to forty years‘ 
imprisonment in 2005. H.B. 1058, S. 2864, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (codified at MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-5-35 (2005)). 
 17. H.B. 161, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-625(2)(c) (2009)).  
 18. S. 341, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730(2) (2005)). 
 19. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 184–88 (2d Cir. 2010). For example, a Virginia 
newspaper reported that two child pornography viewers are serving longer sentences—fifty years for 
one defendant and twenty-three for the other—than the defendant (the uncle of the victim in the 
photos) who created and distributed the images viewed. The uncle, who was ―convicted of repeatedly 
raping [the victim], filming the attacks and selling the videos, is eligible for parole in 2011 after 
serving a minimum of 12 years.‖ Tim McGlone, Victim of child porn seeks damages from viewers, 
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recent study of federal sentencing practices documents that a typical 
possessor of child pornography will receive a significantly longer sentence 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines than a defendant who engages in 
repeated sex with a twelve-year-old girl.
20
 It is also a significantly longer 
sentence than the one imposed in a reported case from the Eighth Circuit 
where an offender paid to have a mother hold down her nine-year-old 
child while he raped the young girl twice a week for two years.
21
  
The longer sentences for possession of child pornography than for 
instances of child sex abuse appear to be attributable not to conscious 
legislative design,
22
 but rather to the piling on of various sentencing 
enhancements. For example, several states increase sentences based on the 
number of images a child pornography offender possesses. Alaska, 
Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, and Utah treat each image possessed as a 
separate criminal offense,
23
 and Connecticut differentiates between various 
degrees of possession based on the number of images an offender 
possesses.
24
 The federal sentencing scheme also provides for sentencing 
increases based on the number of images possessed.
25
 Treating each image 
as a separate offense can result in extremely long sentences, especially 
because the Internet allows individuals to amass a significant number of 
 
 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 25, 2009, http://hamptonroads.com/2009/10/victim-child-porn-seeks-damages-
viewers. 
 20. TROY STABENOW, FED. PUB. DEFENDER OFFICE, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL 
STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 26–29 
(rev. ed. 2009), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf. 
 21. United States v. Kane, 470 F.3d 1277, 1281–82 (8th Cir. 2006) (recounting co-defendant‘s 
sentence). 
 22. To the contrary, public opinion appears to reserve its desire for the most draconian sex abuse 
penalties for the sexual abuse of children. The public ―seems to overwhelmingly favor the use of the 
death penalty for sex crimes against children. According to one poll, sixty-five percent of those 
surveyed supported the death penalty for child molesters.‖ Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than 
R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1119, 1138 
(2004). 
 23. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127(c) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3551(11), 13-
3553(A)(2) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3(3) (West 2010). 
Tennessee provides that each image may be charged as a separate count. It also provides that if an 
individual possesses more than fifty images, then it is classified as a Class C felony, but if the 
individual possesses more than 100 images, then it is classified as a Class D felony. Possession is 
ordinarily a Class D felony. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1003(b), (d) (West 2010). 
 24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196f (West 2007) (classifying possession of fewer than 
twenty images of child pornography as Class D felony punishable by minimum one year 
imprisonment); Id. § 53a-196e (classifying possession of between twenty and forty-nine images of 
child pornography as Class C felony punishable by minimum two years‘ imprisonment); Id. § 53a-
196d (classifying possession of fifty or more images of child pornography as Class B felony 
punishable by minimum five years‘ imprisonment). 
 25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(7) (2009). 
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images with little effort.
26
 In one instance, an Arizona defendant was 
sentenced to two hundred years‘ imprisonment for the possession of child 
pornography—a sentence that was the result of a statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years
27
 in connection with a statutory mandate 
that requires the imposition of a consecutive sentence for each image 
possessed.
28
 (The defendant was charged with possessing twenty 
images.)
29
 That sentence is not only remarkably long in absolute terms, but 
it is also longer than the sentences imposed on several defendants who 
sexually abused children. The same Arizona state sentencing regime that 
sent a defendant to jail for two hundred years for possession of child 
pornography also imposed a fifteen-year sentence on another defendant 
who twice molested a six-year-old girl; imposed a twenty-two-month 
sentence on a priest who molested an altar boy; and imposed a one-year 
sentence on a man who kidnapped and sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-
old girl who was selling candy door-to-door.
30
 
In addition to enhancements based on the number of images possessed, 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines identify a number of other 
enhancements that may increase the sentence of an individual convicted of 
possessing child pornography.
31
 One of those enhancements is based on 
whether the defendant‘s conduct ―involved the use of a computer.‖32 A 
federal defendant‘s sentence may also be enhanced if the government can 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
33
 that the offender 
 
 
 26. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-705(D) (2010) (possession of child pornography that depicts a 
minor under the age of fifteen is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years‘ 
imprisonment). The state provides the same penalties for possession of child pornography as it does 
for ―molestation of a child, commercial sexual exploitation of a minor, . . . aggravated luring a minor 
for sexual exploitation, child abuse [and] kidnapping‖ of a child. Id.; State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 
(Ariz. 2006). 
 28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-705(M) (2010) (―The sentence imposed on a person . . . shall be 
consecutive to any other sentence imposed on the person at any time . . . .‖). 
 29. Berger, 134 P.3d at 379.  
 30. Supplemental Brief for Appellant, State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (No. CR-05-
0101), 2006 WL 1002320 at *1–2. 
 31. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2009). 
 32. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(6). Because it was the advent of the Internet that led to a resurgence of child 
pornography, see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text, it is perhaps unsurprising that this 
enhancement applies in the majority of federal cases, see infra note 188. 
 33. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adjust a defendant‘s sentence based not only on the 
offense of conviction, but also based on ―the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless 
of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted‖. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, 
pt. A(4) (2009). Factual findings about such ―relevant conduct‖ are subject to a preponderance 
standard. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (―The Guidelines state that it is 
‗appropriate‘ that facts relevant to sentencing be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and we 
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engaged in the sexual abuse of a minor
34
 or attempted to use the image to 
―groom‖ a minor to engage in sexual contact.35 
In some jurisdictions, sentencing severity can be traced to statutory 
schemes that treat the possession of child pornography as equivalent to 
more culpable criminal conduct, such as the production or distribution of 
child pornography. Arizona, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Utah all punish the possession of child pornography as 
harshly as the production or manufacture of the images;
36
 Wyoming does 
as well for repeat offenders.
37
 Arkansas, Louisiana, and the federal 
government punish possession of child pornography as harshly as 
distribution.
38
 Indeed, some sentencing increases for possession appear to 
 
 
have held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.‖ 
(citation omitted)). 
 34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(5). 
 35. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(D), (E). 
 36. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516(c) (2007); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 97-5-33, 97-5-35 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 22-24A-3 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (West 2010). Notably, in 2002, Hawaii amended its 
statutory scheme to treat possession of child pornography less severely than distribution. See Laws 
2002 Haw. Laws, ch. 200, § 1, 3 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-752(4) (2002)) (revising statute 
that, prior to 2002, treated the possession of child pornography as identical to the dissemination of 
such images). 
 37. Wyoming treats subsequent child pornography possession offenses the same as subsequent 
convictions for manufacture or distribution of child pornography, though it distinguishes between 
possession and manufacture and distribution for first offenses. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-303(d), (e) 
(2009). 
 38. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-27-602 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1(A)(2), (E)(3) (2004). 
The federal statutory scheme is somewhat complicated. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006) prohibits four 
distinct categories of conduct: (1) transporting or shipping child pornography in interstate or foreign 
commerce; (2) receiving or distributing child pornography that has been mailed, shipped, or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce; (3) selling, or possessing with intent to sell, child 
pornography that has been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce; and (4) knowingly 
possessing child pornography that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce. The statute appears to 
treat simple possession less harshly than other conduct, as it is punishable by a maximum sentence of 
ten years with no mandatory minimum, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), while the other three categories are 
punishable by a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of twenty years, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(1). But, in reality, most possessors of child pornography are subject to the five- to twenty-
year sentence for ―receiving‖ because most child pornography is found on the Internet and it ―is 
generally necessary to receive pornography in order to possess it.‖ United States v. Sudyka, No. 
8:07CR383, 2008 WL 1766765, at *8 (D. Neb. Apr. 14, 2008); see also STABENOW, supra note 20, at 
17, 27 (noting that ―[t]he internet provides the typical means of obtaining child pornography‖ and 
quoting the U.S. Sentencing Commission as noting that ―there appears to be little difference in the 
offense seriousness between typical receipt cases and typical possession cases [because] all material 
that is possessed must at some point have been received (unless it was produced, in which case the 
defendant would be sentenced under the more severe production guideline)‖ (citation omitted)). 
Presumably in recognition of this fact, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which initially treated 
possession of child pornography as distinct from (and less culpable than) trafficking in child 
pornography, ultimately consolidated the two offenses into a single guideline. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM‘N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 37 
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have been driven by legislative intent to increase penalties for this more 
culpable conduct, and where the statute does not distinguish between 
them, the penalties for possession are increased without separate 
discussion.
39
 
II. SCRUTINIZING THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INCREASED SENTENCES 
The modern trend of increasing sentences can be traced to a tendency 
to blur the distinction between the possession of child pornography and 
child sex abuse ―contact offenses‖—i.e., sexual offenses that involve 
physical contact.
40
 Equating possession of child pornography with contact 
offenses arises in three particular arguments that are advanced for 
increasing the sentences associated with possession of child pornography. 
First, some have tried to justify the sentencing severity by arguing that 
possession of child pornography is equivalent to or worse than actual sex 
abuse of a child. Second, some assert that possessing and viewing child 
pornography increases an individual‘s risk of committing child sex abuse. 
Third, others assert that, because possession of child pornography is 
highly correlated with a history of contact offenses, punishing possessors 
of child pornography can serve as a proxy for sexual abuse. I refer to these 
last two arguments as arguments for preventative punishment and for 
proxy punishment, respectively. 
This section identifies where these three arguments appear in the child 
pornography debate, then explains why each argument is problematic. As 
 
 
n.67 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/ 
Guideline_Application_Frequencies/2008/08_glinexgline.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, 
USE OF GUIDELINES]; see also STABENOW, supra note 20, at 3–6, 19–21 (describing the relevant 
history). Further recognition of the essentially identical nature of possession and receipt charges can be 
found in recent circuit court opinions declaring that charges for both possession and receipt of the 
same images violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 977–78 
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 39. See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 20, at 6–7 (recounting remarks by Senator Jesse Helms 
regarding sentencing issues for possession of child pornography, which Helms referred to as 
sentencing issues regarding ―smut peddlers‖—i.e., child pornography distributors); see also 
O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 23–26 (recounting how international efforts to criminalize 
child pornography were spurred by an incident where a Belgian man made pornographic videos and 
pictures of kidnapped children, but it is clear that the most horrible part of the story is the abuse, 
conditions of confinement, and death of his victims). 
 40. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 57 (claiming that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for possession of child pornography ―are predicated on the untested 
assumption that anyone who would access and view child porn is a potential child molester‖). But see 
ALEXANDRA GELBER, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO ―A RELUCTANT REBELLION‖ 8–9 (2009), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf (disputing that 
federal sentences for the possession of child pornography ―seek to reach past or future molestation‖). 
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explained in more detail below, the ―worse than abuse‖ argument and the 
proxy punishment argument have significant theoretical flaws, and there is 
insufficient data to support either the preventative punishment or proxy 
punishment arguments.  
Of course, the public may support long sentences for possession of 
child pornography out of a sense of disgust or a desire to condemn those 
who look at pictures that sexualize children.
41
 But the social consensus 
that viewing child pornography is a serious offense worthy of serious 
punishment does not mean that possession is indistinguishable from 
contact sex offenses against children, nor that the two offenses should 
receive equal punishment. To treat the two offenses as equivalent ignores 
proportionality concerns and, as discussed below in Part III, may have 
unintended consequences. What is more, the fact that possessors of child 
pornography are—at least in some cases—garnering longer sentences than 
those who sexually abuse children should be troubling to even the most 
passionate of anti–child pornography advocates. 
A. Pornography as Abuse or Worse than Abuse 
Some have contended that longer sentences for possessing child 
pornography are warranted because possession is equivalent to or worse 
than contact offenses. This contention does not withstand close evaluation 
because the harm associated with possession of child pornography is 
purely derivative of the harm associated with child sex abuse. Ultimately, 
the claim that child pornography is equivalent to or worse than child abuse 
appears to be simply an example of hyperbole used by interest groups and 
political actors to draw attention to the issue, rather than a serious 
assertion of principle. 
 
 
 41. See, e.g., O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 228 (―Child pornography legislation is 
important even if it leads to few arrests, because it demonstrates society‘s denunciation of the activity 
and acknowledges the experience of victims.‖). For more general discussion of the role of 
condemnation in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 413, 419–25 (1999) (discussing the importance of criminal law in expressing condemnation of 
disfavored groups or actions); Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, 
Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 
1026 (2004) (―Criminal theory is replete with discussions describing criminal punishment as premised 
on the desire to punish bad people.‖). 
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1. Identifying the Argument 
It is often said that child pornography is not simply a record of sexual 
abuse, but is itself a form of child sex abuse.
42
 Indeed, several statutory 
schemes have classified possession of child pornography as sexual 
abuse.
43
 Government actors have also characterized the possession of child 
pornography either as sexual abuse or as an offense that is as serious as 
sexual abuse.
44
 In addition to those who equate the gravity of possessing 
child pornography with contact offenses, there are some who have 
suggested that child pornography is comparatively worse.
45
 For example, 
the Supreme Court favorably quoted a commentator who stated that child 
pornography ―poses an even greater threat to the child victim than does 
sexual abuse or prostitution.‖46 And a Los Angeles Police detective gave a 
public statement ―rating child pornography as worse than murder,‖ which 
appeared in the Chicago Tribune and was cited in congressional 
hearings.
47
 The equivalent-to-or-worse-than argument sometimes takes the 
form of victim statements suggesting that the existence of child 
pornography is worse than the abuse inherent in its creation. For example, 
a recent memorandum by the Department of Justice‘s Child Exploitation 
and Obscenity Section included a quotation from a child pornography 
victim stating: ―I‘m more upset about the pictures on the Internet than I am 
about what [the defendant] did to me physically.‖48 
The claim that child pornography is equivalent to or worse than other 
instances of child sex abuse, if proven correct, would be a powerful 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 4 (2008) (―Child pornography involving real images of children is 
therefore a form of sexual abuse and exploitation . . . .‖); Adler, supra note 3, at 938 n.80 (―The view 
that child pornography is sexual abuse, that it is in fact the core of sexual abuse, persists as the 
foundation of the approach taken by courts, legislators, politicians, and the media.‖). 
 43. E.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-625(1)(e) (2009) (classifying the possession of child 
pornography as ―sexual abuse of children‖); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(d) (West 2010) (same). 
Hawaii categorizes possession on child pornography as ―promoting child abuse in the third degree,‖ 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-752 (2007), and Oregon classifies possession of child pornography as 
―encouraging child abuse,‖ OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.686, 163.687 (2003). 
 44. ATT‘Y GEN.‘S COMM‘N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 406 (1986) (―[C]hild 
pornography is child abuse.‖); 132 CONG. REC. S14,225 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986) (statement of Sen. 
Roth) (―[T]hose who advertise in order to receive or deal in child pornography and child prostitution 
are as guilty of child abuse as the actual child molester . . . .‖). 
 45. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. STANMEYER, THE SEDUCTION OF SOCIETY: PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE 88 (1984) (―Child pornography is the worst form of child abuse.‖). 
 46. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (quoting David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)). 
 47. Tina M. Beranbaum et al., Child Pornography in the Late 1970s, in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
AND SEX RINGS 9 & n.11 (Ann W. Burgess ed., 1984) (recounting the statement). 
 48. GELBER, supra note 40, at 3. 
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argument in favor of the recent trend of increased sentence lengths. That is 
because the gravity of a crime is a widely accepted criterion for 
determining the allocation of criminal justice resources.
49
 For example, if 
two crimes were committed simultaneously—the first a murder and the 
second a theft of property worth less than $1,000—and if there were 
limited resources, then we would expect law enforcement to spend more 
resources investigating the more serious crime (the murder), and we would 
expect a judge to impose a longer sentence for the more serious crime.
50
 
2. Problems With the Argument 
The equivalent-to-or-worse-than argument also fails any sustained 
evaluation of relative harms. The principal harm associated with 
possession of child pornography is the child sex abuse involved in the 
creation of the pornographic images.
51
 The Supreme Court has explained 
that the First Amendment interest of child pornography possessors can be 
overcome only because private possession of child pornography may 
create a market for the creation of such images.
52
 This strongly suggests 
 
 
 49. Both utilitarians and retributivists are likely to find the distribution of criminal justice 
resources according to crime seriousness to be uncontroversial. Utilitarians are concerned with 
reducing crime rates. Any sophisticated utilitarian account of crime control makes cost-benefit 
decisions about whom to incarcerate for longer periods of time. And with the possible exception of 
those who subscribe to rehabilitation, those decisions are informed by the seriousness of various 
crimes. For example, someone who subscribes to a deterrence rationale for punishment would set 
penalties for murder higher than larceny, because it is more important to avoid the harm associated 
with murder. Similarly, someone who subscribes to incapacitation (at least selective incapacitation) 
would care about incapacitating those offenders who are more likely to commit serious or violent 
crimes than less serious or nonviolent crimes. And retributivists believe that the amount of punishment 
for a particular crime ought to be proportional to the gravity of the crime, which is assessed based on 
the blameworthiness of the individual offender and the harm caused by the offense. 
 50. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
186 (1968) (noting that seriousness of a felony is positively correlated with higher probability of 
conviction and longer sentences). 
 51. While some commentators have noted that current child pornography laws appear to include 
images that were created without any child sex abuse (a development that is troubling for First 
Amendment reasons), see Adler, supra note 3, at 941–42, this Article will assume for argument‘s sake 
that all child pornography was created by sexually abusing a child. 
 52. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7. The Court provided the following analysis in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: 
The Government . . . argues that the [prohibition of possession of virtual child pornography] 
is necessary because pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children. There 
are many things innocent in themselves, however, such as cartoons, video games, and candy, 
that might be used for immoral purposes, yet we would not expect those to be prohibited 
because they can be misused. The Government, of course, may punish adults who provide 
unsuitable materials to children, . . . and it may enforce criminal penalties for unlawful 
solicitation. The precedents establish, however, that speech within the rights of adults to hear 
may not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from it. . . .  
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that, as a constitutional matter, the harm of possessing child pornography 
is lesser than and derivative of the harm associated with the child sex 
abuse inherent in the images‘ creation. Indeed, much of the rhetoric 
regarding the harmfulness of possessing child pornography consists 
essentially of second-order arguments about the harm of child sex abuse—
i.e., punishment is necessary either to stop the production of the 
pornographic materials
53
 or it is necessary to prevent the possessors of 
child pornography (who are assumed to be sexually attracted to children) 
from sexually assaulting children later in time.
54
 
Some have argued that child pornography causes additional harms after 
an image is created, but those harms are also derivative of child sex abuse. 
One harm, according to commentators who rely on concepts from tort law, 
is an additional and separate privacy or reputation harm to the child victim 
every time that someone views the image.
55
 Another harm others have 
identified is that child sex offenders can use the images to ―groom‖ or 
seduce children into engaging in sexual acts.
56
 These arguments suggest 
that there are sound reasons to prohibit the possession of child 
 
 
 . . . The Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply because it may fall into the 
hands of children. The evil in question depends upon the actor's unlawful conduct, conduct 
defined as criminal quite apart from any link to the speech in question. This establishes that 
the speech ban is not narrowly drawn. The objective is to prohibit illegal conduct, but this 
restriction goes well beyond that interest by restricting the speech available to law-abiding 
adults. 
 The Government submits further that virtual child pornography whets the appetites of 
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct. This rationale cannot sustain 
the provision in question. The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a 
sufficient reason for banning it. The government ―cannot constitutionally premise legislation 
on the desirability of controlling a person‘s private thoughts.‖ . . . First Amendment freedoms 
are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that 
impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be 
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought. 
535 U.S. 234, 251–53 (2002) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)). 
 53. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
759–60, 761 (1982); Cheryl Hanna & Pamela Vesilind, Preview of United States v. Stevens: Animal 
Law, Obscenity, and the Limits of Government Censorship, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 59, 66 (2009) 
(quoting government contention that ―outlawing the possession and distribution of child pornography 
decreases actual child exploitation and abuse.‖). 
 54. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 55. E.g., Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography‟s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 862 
(2008) (arguing that ―the possessor causes actual harm because re-publication inflicts shame and 
humiliation upon the child depicted‖); see also Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 121-1(7), 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234 (2002) (noting congressional finding that ―child pornography which includes an image of a 
recognizable minor invades the child‘s privacy and reputational interests, since images that are created 
showing a child‘s face or other identifiable feature on a body engaging in sexually explicit conduct can 
haunt the minor for years to come‖). 
 56. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; AKDENIZ, supra note 42, at 4–5. 
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pornography, but they do not demonstrate that possession of child 
pornography is equivalent to or worse than child sex abuse. To the 
contrary, both of these harms are derivative of the harm of abuse rather 
than the images themselves. This is because the privacy or reputation of a 
child is not damaged by viewing any image of that child—viewing an 
image of a child eating an ice cream cone or watching television would not 
have such an effect. Rather, the privacy of the child is implicated only 
because a pornographic image is an image of sexual abuse. Likewise, the 
harm associated with using pornographic images to groom or seduce 
another child is the harm of the future sexual abuse of that child, not the 
child in the image. 
Many discuss the need to increase sentences for possession as a way to 
decrease child sex abuse, which also suggests that possession of child 
pornography is not as serious a crime as child sex abuse. If possession of 
child pornography were truly viewed as equivalent to or worse than child 
sex abuse, then we would not expect to see the discussion of child 
pornography framed in terms of whether it contributes to or amplifies the 
harm associated with child sex abuse.
57
 Rather, we would expect to see 
possession of pornography most often discussed as independently 
harmful.
58
 
Indeed, the idea that pornography is equivalent to or worse than abuse 
does not withstand a simple thought experiment. Imagine, for example, 
being given the choice between suffering a sexual assault or having a 
convincing but fraudulent pornographic image of oneself circulated (i.e., 
an image created through digital manipulation and thus not a product of 
sexual abuse). It is difficult to believe that many people would choose the 
victimization associated with sexual abuse over the victimization 
associated with the fraudulent pornographic image. 
 
 
 57. For examples of such discussions, see United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 
1998) (―The consumers of child pornography therefore victimize the children depicted in child 
pornography by enabling and supporting the continued production of child pornography, which entails 
continuous direct abuse and victimization of child subjects.‖); State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 
387 (Ariz. 2006) (―Production of the images Berger possessed required the abuse of children, and 
Berger‘s consumption of such material cannot be disassociated from that abuse for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.‖). 
 58. The independent harms that are most often discussed—the violation of the children‘s ―rights 
of privacy and human dignity‖ when images are viewed, see Rogers, supra note 55, at 854, and the 
harm of possessors abusing future children, see 149 CONG. REC. S2573, S2583–84 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 
2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch)—are, as discussed in the previous paragraph, ultimately derivative of 
the harm of abuse. 
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To the extent that one might argue that it is the publicity of a shameful 
act that makes the victimization of pornography so terrible,
59
 it is worth 
noting a troubling implication of this argument—that is, the perpetuation 
of secrecy associated with child sex abuse. Child sex abuse victims are 
often subject to repeated abuse at the hands of their abusers. The abuse 
continues because offenders are able to manipulate their victims into 
keeping the abuse secret,
60
 oftentimes through telling the victim that there 
will be bad consequences for the victim if anyone finds out about the 
abuse.
61
 The equivalent-to-or-worse-than argument taps into this 
pernicious culture of secrecy by perpetuating the idea that allowing others 
to see pictures of the abuse—i.e., revealing the secret of the abuse—is as 
bad as or worse than the abuse itself.
62
 Anti–child pornography advocates 
may use the equivalent-to-or-worse-than rhetoric ―to raise consciousness‖ 
about child pornography, and they ―may have the best of intentions.‖63 
However, by characterizing the loss of secrecy as a harm, they are 
perpetuating, albeit indirectly, a culture of secrecy that allows child sex 
abuse to continue undetected. 
B. Preventative Punishment 
On its face, the preventative punishment argument appears to be the 
most defensible reason for increasing child pornography sentences. That is 
because punishing behavior in order to avoid the risk of future crime is a 
well-established feature of modern criminal law. However, as noted 
below, there is little empirical evidence demonstrating that significantly 
 
 
 59. E.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-
26 (1996), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (characterizing one 
harm of the creation of child pornography as a ―reputational‖ or ―privacy‖ interest, because the 
―images . . . can haunt the minor for years to come‖). 
 60. See, e.g., CARLA VAN DAM, THE SOCIALLY SKILLED CHILD MOLESTER: DIFFERENTIATING 
THE GUILTY FROM THE FALSELY ACCUSED 84 (2006) (noting that secrecy of child sex abuse ―allows it 
to flourish‖); Amy Hammel-Zabin, The Mind of a Child Molester, PSYCHOL. TODAY, July 1, 2003, 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200306/the-mind-child-molester (noting that secrecy is ―a 
critical weapon both to entice and ensnare‖ victims of child sex abuse). 
 61. ―Abused children are often told not to disclose [the sex abuse] to anyone . . . . Secrecy is 
usually reinforced by violence, threats of violence or punishment. Sometimes we find a mixture of 
threats and bribery where the secondary gain of bribes and of special treatment maintains the secrecy, 
which is nonetheless basically founded on threats.‖ TILMAN FURNISS, THE MULTI-PROFESSIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 24 (1991). 
 62. Corey Rayburn Yung has made a related point with respect to the modern discussion of rape 
being a fate worse than death—i.e., that ―the rhetoric comparing death to rape contributes to a cultural 
norm built upon Victorian artifacts that elevates wom[e]n‘s chastity to the very essence of their 
identity.‖ Rayburn, supra note 22, at 1154. 
 63. Id. at 1147–48 (making this point in the context of rape). 
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increasing sentences for possession of child pornography will lead to an 
appreciable decrease in child sex abuse. In any event, even if punishing 
possession with longer sentences might lead to some decrease in contact 
offenses against children, it would not suggest that possession of child 
pornography should be punished more harshly than contact offenses. 
1. Identifying the Argument 
Possessing child pornography is thought to increase an individual‘s risk 
of sexually abusing a child, and thus longer sentences are necessary to 
incapacitate these individuals and eliminate any opportunity to commit a 
contact offense.
64
 The risk that possession of child pornography is thought 
to create is generally described in two ways: First, viewing the 
pornographic images ―inflames‖ the possessor and thus leads him to 
physically abuse a child.
65
 According to this argument, if individuals do 
not possess images in the first instance, then they will not commit a 
subsequent contact offense. Second, pedophiles use pornographic images 
to ―groom‖ children—i.e., convince them that it is acceptable to engage in 
sexual acts with adults.
66
 If pedophiles do not have access to pornographic 
images of children, so the argument goes, then they are less likely to 
succeed in their future attempts to convince minors to engage in sexual 
contact with them. 
There are a number of examples of government actors expressing the 
idea that child pornography possessors present a higher risk of sexually 
abusing a child.
67
 Indeed, Congress cited both the notion that child 
 
 
 64. ―[I]n recent years, a near consensus has emerged that children are placed at risk [of child sex 
abuse] simply as a consequence of an individual being in possession of child pornography.‖ Suzanne 
Ost, Children at Risk: Legal and Societal Perceptions of the Potential Threat that the Possession of 
Child Pornography Poses to Society, 29 J.L. & SOC‘Y 436, 437 (2002). 
 65. See, e.g., AKDENIZ, supra note 42, at 11 (quoting the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Council of Europe‘s Cybercrime Convention 2001); STANMEYER, supra note 45, at 81. 
 66. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); AKDENIZ, supra note 42, at 4–5. 
 67. 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws 674–677 (finding that child pornography is ―frequently utilized to lure 
other children into sexual conduct‖ and that ―it further develops the climate encouraging the sexual 
exploitation of other children‖); 149 CONG. REC. H9735 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Osborne) (―Roughly 80 to 90 percent of pedophiles and rapists report using pornography, oft times 
before they commit an event. So, some people say, well, what is the big deal? Pornography is 
harmless. It does not really have any victim. Yet, if you think about it, we spend billions of dollars in 
this country on commercials, and if those commercials did not change behavior, if what you see and 
what you hear and what you read does not change your behavior, then we are spending billions of 
dollars unnecessarily. So, obviously, the pornography industry does have a tremendous impact on 
behavior . . . .‖); 149 CONG. REC. S2573, S2583–84 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (―Congress has long recognized that child pornography produces three distinct and lasting 
harms to our children. First, child pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles and prompts them to 
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pornography incites viewers to sexually abuse children and the notion that 
these images can be used to ―groom‖ children when it criminalized the 
possession of virtual child pornography in the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996.
68
 The National Center for Missing & Exploited 
Children, which receives government funding and operates a 
congressionally funded tip line for child sex exploitation,
69
 recently 
published a report on possession of child pornography that concluded: 
―Even if some of them never go on to sexually victimize a child, it is 
reasonable to view and treat arrested [child pornography] possessors as at 
high risk for victimizing children.‖70 
There are many examples of preventative punishment in the modern 
criminal justice system. Certain behavior is often criminalized, not 
because the behavior itself is thought to be harmful, but rather because it is 
thought to create a significant risk of other harmful behavior.
71
 Think, for 
example, about the federal law prohibiting individuals who previously 
have been convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm.
72
 That 
prohibition and the convictions that arise from it are most often justified 
on the theory that a prior felony conviction indicates a greater likelihood 
that an individual will use a firearm to harm another.
73
 Another highly 
 
 
act out their perverse sexual fantasies on real children. Second, child pornography is a tool used by 
pedophiles to break down the inhibitions of children. Third, child pornography creates an 
immeasurable and indelible harm on the children who are abused to manufacture it.‖); GELBER, supra 
note 40, at 5–6 (disputing claim that possessors of child pornography ―do[] not, and will not, pose a 
physical threat to a child‖); U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES 
AGAINST CHILDREN, at i (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/SCAC.HTM 
[hereinafter USSC 1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS] (―[A] significant portion of child pornography 
offenders . . . show the greatest risk of victimizing children . . . .‖); Hansen, supra note 40, at 59 
(interviewing an Assistant U.S. Attorney who insists that ―some child porn offenders will go on to 
molest a child‖). 
 68. See, e.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121-1(3)–(4), 
110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) 
(including congressional findings that (a) ―child pornography is often used as part of a method of 
seducing other children into sexual activity; a child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with 
an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing 
depictions of other children ‗having fun‘ participating in such activity,‖ and (b) ―child pornography is 
often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites‖). 
 69. See 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b) (2006). 
 70. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., NAT‘L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD-
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 34 (2005), available at http://www.missingkids. 
com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf. 
 71. Classic examples of such crimes include the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and 
solicitation. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 160–
61 (2008). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the “Wrong” Hands: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] DISENTANGLING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 873 
 
 
 
 
visible example of preventative punishment is the crime of drunk driving. 
It is a criminal offense to operate a motor vehicle if your blood alcohol 
content is above a certain level.
74
 Driving under the influence is forbidden 
not because there is anything inherently wrong with driving while 
intoxicated, but rather because people are more likely to crash and cause 
harm to themselves and others if they drive drunk. Getting drunk drivers 
off the streets and deterring individuals from driving while intoxicated are 
done in the name of avoiding the safety risk that drunk drivers pose.
75
 
2. Problems With the Argument 
Although increasing sentences in order to account for future risk of 
harm is a well-established feature of the modern criminal justice system, 
there are a number of theoretical and empirical problems with justifying 
the modern trend of increased sentences for child pornography possession 
as preventative punishment. Preventative punishment may either be 
justified under retributive theory or as a utilitarian crime-control 
measure.
76
 Under the retributive model, preventative punishment is subject 
to several limiting principles. Under the utilitarian model, preventative 
punishment must pass empirical muster. The modern trend of increased 
punishment for child pornography possession satisfies neither the limiting 
principles of retributivism nor the empirical challenges of utilitarianism. 
Many retributivists have expressed discomfort with the practice of 
punishing behavior because of the risk it poses to others.
77
 Retributivism is 
based on the concept that punishment is justified only where there is both 
harm and blameworthiness.
78
 Preventative punishment seeks to punish 
based on the risk of harm, as opposed to harm that has already occurred. 
 
 
The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 93–94 (1995). The 
restriction could also be justified as a loss of civil rights associated with conviction—akin to felon 
disenfranchisement. 
 74. See generally Driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol, 7A AM. JUR. 2D 
Automobiles § 356 (2009). 
 75. See, e.g., Mich. Dep‘t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990). 
 76. There are two overarching theories of punishment—retributivism and utilitarianism. 
Retributivists seek to punish individuals for their criminal acts because, having committed those acts, 
the defendant deserves punishment. Utilitarians, in contrast, seek to punish in order to bring about 
future reductions in crime. See generally Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing 
Fiction of Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 563 (2006). 
 77. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE 
SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 43, 48 (Stuart P. Green & R.A. Duff eds., 2005); see also 
Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS, 61 FLA. L. REV. 797, 808 n.71 
(2009) (collecting sources). 
 78. See Andrew Ashworth, Desert, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCINGS: READINGS ON THEORY AND 
POLICY 143 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
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This has led some commentators to reject the validity of preventative 
punishment.
79
 But other retributivists have sought to permit preventative 
punishment in some limited form. For example, some have argued that any 
preventative punishment—that is, punishment imposed to minimize risky 
behavior—must be limited by how serious the harm to others is and how 
likely that harm is to occur.
80
 In other words, the harm risked must be 
serious and the probability of the harm occurring must be relatively high 
in order to justify criminal sanctions.
81
 Other limitations include limiting 
preventative punishment to methods that ―actually decrease the likelihood 
that the ultimate harm will occur‖82 and limiting preventative punishment 
in a manner that ensures that those who never actually present a risk of the 
ultimate harm are not subject to criminal sanctions.
83
 Interestingly, 
whether preventative punishment satisfies these limiting principles poses 
an empirical question, requiring data on whether those who possess child 
pornography have a high probability of committing a future contact 
offense and whether limiting access to child pornography will actually 
decrease the number of individuals who engage in contact offenses. 
Preventative punishment is most often justified on utilitarian crime-
control grounds. But whether preventative punishment sensibly reduces 
crime rates is also an empirical question that can be answered only with 
data showing that lengthening sentences for those who possess child 
pornography will have an appreciable effect on the crime rates for child 
 
 
 79. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 366 (1996) (distinguishing liability for attempt 
and crimes of endangerment and arguing that endangerment should not be criminalized because we 
should only be ―criminally liable for our actions, insofar as they are culpably related to some criminal 
harm‖).  
 80. Packer framed the issue as a question of ―gravity and remoteness of harm.‖ HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 266 (1968). He believed that it was necessary to 
limit convictions for risk of harm in order to preserve some form of the harm principle and that the 
harm principle was ―a way to make sure that a given form of conduct is not being subjected to the 
criminal sanction purely or even primarily because it is thought to be immoral.‖ Id. at 266–67. 
 81. HUSAK, supra note 71, at 161. Husak states that ―a theory of criminalization should preclude 
offenses of risk prevention unless they are designed to reduce a substantial risk.‖ Id. at 161–62. He 
notes that this condition not only requires that preventative crimes be aimed at promoting ―a 
substantial state interest,‖ id. at 161, but also that ―the proscribed conduct must prevent a substantial 
risk that a harm will occur,‖ id. at 162 n.162. 
 82. HUSAK, supra note 71, at 162. At first glance, it may seem as though the prevention 
requirement is duplicative of the limitation based on how likely that harm is to occur. But while the 
likelihood of harm is designed to assess the risk that a particular individual poses, the prevention 
requirement seems designed to ensure that the particular prevention method will actually decrease that 
risk. For example, in the context of felon-in-possession laws, the likelihood of harm question would 
tell us the recidivism risk that previously convicted felons pose, while the prevention requirement 
would require those supporting felon-in-possession laws to demonstrate that felons who have no 
access to firearms will commit fewer crimes than those who do have such access. 
 83. Id. at 168–70. 
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sex abuse. That is because any sophisticated sentencing policy predicated 
on the theory of incapacitation must be able to reduce crime without 
significantly increasing the overall number of persons incarcerated. This 
concept, which is commonly referred to as ―selective incapacitation,‖ 
attempts to identify those offenders who are more likely to recidivate and 
those who are less likely to recidivate, and then adjusts sentence lengths 
according to likelihood of recidivism.
84
 Of course, putting any individual 
in prison will keep him or her from committing a future crime. Thus, in 
order to demonstrate a benefit to offset the costs of incarceration, one must 
demonstrate a significant likelihood that the individual would have 
committed a crime had he or she not been incarcerated. 
The utilitarian argument rests on the assumption that those who view 
child pornography want to engage in sexual conduct with children and that 
possessing the images makes it more likely that they will engage in 
contact offenses. But there are significant reasons to doubt this 
assumption. There is anecdotal evidence that some child pornography 
possessors, although they want to view pornographic images of children, 
actively seek adult sexual partners.
85
 And the empirical literature is unable 
to validate the assumption that there is a causal connection between 
possession of child pornography and child sex abuse.
86
 
As other commentators have noted, the ―quantity and quality of the 
research‖ into the relationship between child pornography possession and 
child sex abuse ―leave a great deal to be desired.‖87 Several studies purport 
to provide information about a connection between child pornography 
 
 
 84. See James Q. Wilson, Selective Incapacitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCINGS: READINGS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 148, 152 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1992); Note, 
Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through  Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 
512 (1982). 
 85. See, e.g., SHELDON & HOWITT, supra note 2, at 112 (describing one Internet offender in their 
study who looked at child pornography as ―a form of ‗foreplay‘ prior to sexual intercourse with his 
adult partner‖); United States v. Whited, 539 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing defendant‘s 
sharing of child pornography with another adult and their plan to arrange a sexual encounter between 
the two of them). 
 86. An article published in 2005 noted that, at that time, there were ―no published data on the 
future offending of child pornography offenders.‖ Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal 
Histories and Later Offending of Child Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE 201, 201 (2005); 
see also Dean D. Knudsen, Child Abuse and Pornography: Is There a Relationship?, 3 J. FAM. 
VIOLENCE 253, 261 (1988) (―The degree to which child sexual abuse is related to the availability of 
child pornography is extremely difficult to establish.‖). Even if there were older social science studies 
documenting a relationship between consumption of child pornography and contact offenses, it is not 
clear whether those studies would continue to be relevant to modern offenders, as child pornography is 
now more widely available via the Internet than it was in the pre–Internet era.  
 87. Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing 
the Law in Line with the Research Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 790 (2007). 
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possession and child sex abuse. But many of those studies only examine 
whether there is a correlation between viewing child pornography and 
child sex abuse—for example, by asking defendants convicted of child sex 
abuse whether they have ever viewed child pornography.
88
 Correlation 
does not prove causation. Those studies that were better designed to 
capture a causal connection—for example, by asking sex offenders 
whether they looked at pornographic images immediately before engaging 
in illegal sexual activity—often failed to distinguish between child 
pornography and other ―deviant‖ pornography (e.g., violent pornography 
involving adults).
89
 
There are also sampling problems with the various studies. Most 
studies of child pornography possession and child sex abuse are limited to 
those individuals who have been convicted of possession of child 
pornography or other sex crimes. As other commentators have noted, there 
is reason to believe that studies of all child pornography users, including 
those who have not come into contact with the criminal justice system, 
could potentially yield different results.
90
 
Ultimately, the available empirical evidence simply does not support 
the preventative punishment model.
91
 As Malamuth and Huppin noted, 
 
 
 88. As Malamuth and Huppin noted: ―There have been a few relevant studies with non-
pedophiles or non-child molesters, but these have examined only a very small subset of the relevant 
issues. More common are studies with pedophiles and child molesters that survey their usage of child 
pornography.‖ Id. 
 89. See id. at 800; Ost, supra note 64, at 450; see also Drew A. Kingston et al., Pornography Use 
and Sexual Aggression: The Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among 
Sexual Offenders, 34 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 341 (2008) (finding that viewing ―deviant‖ pornography 
increased future sexual aggression for all viewers but failing to distinguish between child pornography 
and other ―deviant‖ pornography, e.g., violent pornography). 
 90. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 70, at 31; Hansen, supra note 40, at 57; Seto & Eke, supra note 
86, at 209; see also O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 80 (noting that ―[s]tudies involving child 
pornography offenders are limited to those who have been caught, are in custody or receiving 
treatment, and are willing to participate‖ and thus the data from those studies ―are at best 
representative of a very small minority of this group of offenders‖). 
 91. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 87, at 776, 820 (surveying the scientific literature in an 
―attempt to determine whether the evidentiary record is sufficient to establish a legally cognizable link 
between the use of various types of pornography and child molestation‖ and ultimately concluding that 
―evidence does not support the proposition that there is a strong connection between being a child 
pornography offender and committing sexual molestation‖); Seto & Eke, supra note 86, at 208 
(―contradict[ing] the assumption that all pornography offenders are at very high risk to commit contact 
sexual offenses involving children‖—those possessors of child pornography who also had committed 
sexual abuse (i.e., a ―contact offense‖) were more likely to reoffend, while those who had only been 
convicted of possession were significantly less likely to commit a subsequent act of sexual abuse); 
Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to 
Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1305 (2010) (―On the critical question of 
whether possession of child pornography will lead an offender to ‗cross over‘ to contact offenses, 
many studies have found no causal connection between the two.‖). Other studies provide evidence that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
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while individuals who have previously been convicted of contact offenses 
may pose a recidivism risk if exposed to child pornography, ―studies show 
little demonstrable risk for other individuals (including child-pornography 
offenders without a history of contact sexual offending) to commit future 
molestation pursuant to pornography consumption.‖92 
In addition to the lack of affirmative support for a causal connection, 
the case against preventative punishment is also supported by a few 
controversial studies that suggest that access to pornography actually 
reduces contact offenses.
93
 One study—which was based on an 
anonymous Internet survey—found that the vast majority of respondents 
who had viewed ―boy erotica‖ reported that viewing this form of child 
pornography ―redirected their sexual energies away from actual sexual 
contacts with boys.‖94 The respondents from that survey also 
overwhelmingly reported that viewing child pornography did not increase 
their tendency to seek out children for sexual conduct.
95
 Of course, this 
survey data is of limited empirical value because the respondents were self 
selected, their responses were anonymous, and the veracity of their 
answers cannot be verified. It is, nonetheless, of some value because it 
captures information from those who possess images of child pornography 
but have not yet come in contact with the criminal justice system.
96
 
 
 
tends to undercut the causation assumption, such as the studies finding that when child sex offenders 
are ―inflamed‖ into committing sex crimes against children, they viewed adult pornography, not child 
pornography. See Kingston et al., supra note 89, at 347 (finding that those child sex abusers who did 
view pornographic images prior to committing contact offenses viewed nonchild pornography); David 
L. Wheeler, The Relationship Between Pornography Usage and Child Molesting, in 57(8-A) 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT‘L SERIES A: HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 3691 (1997), described in Malamuth 
& Huppin, supra note 87, at 797 (finding that child molesters tended to view pornography more often 
than non-child molesters, but that the most common type of images viewed by the molesters ―involved 
nudity or consenting sexual activities between adults‖ rather than child pornography). 
 92. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 87, at 827. 
 93. See Berl Kutchinsky, The Effect of Easy Availability of Pornography on the Incidence of Sex 
Crimes: The Danish Experience, 29 J. SOC. ISSUES 163 (1973) (noting a decrease in the number of 
child molestations over time in Copenhagen, Denmark, as pornography became more widely 
available). A study about sexual fantasies noted that contact offenders appeared to have fewer sexual 
fantasies than pornography possessors and tentatively suggested that ―Internet offenders [possessors of 
child pornography] may have less need to contact offend since they can generate fantasy more easily.‖ 
Kerry Sheldon & Dennis Howitt, Sexual Fantasy in Paedophile Offenders: Can Any Model Explain 
Satisfactorily New Findings From a Study of Internet and Contact Sexual Offenders?, 13 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 153 (2008). 
 94. ―[Forty-nine percent] reported that this was the case ‗invariably,‘ 25% ‗usually,‘ 10% 
‗frequently,‘ 8% ‗occasionally,‘ 3% ‗rarely,‘ and 5% ‗never.‘‖ Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 87, at 
800–01 (describing David L. Riegel, Letter to the Editor, Effects on Boy-Attracted Pedosexual Males 
of Viewing Boy Erotica, 33 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 321 (2004)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. As noted above, researchers have encountered sampling problems in attempting to study this 
population. See supra note 90. 
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As a general matter, whether viewing any sexually explicit materials 
encourages individuals to engage in sexually aggressive behavior has long 
been a contested issue.
97
 For some time, the public debate surrounding 
nonchild pornography included assertions from some antipornography 
advocates that viewing pornography—which is often filled with degrading 
images of women—caused men to treat women poorly.98 Other advocates 
made more specific claims about violent pornography causing men to rape 
or otherwise physically abuse women.
99
 These claims were disputed and 
refuted by a number of prominent commentators.
100
 Not only does adult 
pornography not appear to cause violence against women, but there also 
―may be an inverse relationship between exposure to sexually explicit 
expression and actual violence.‖101 As one commentator noted, the 
increasing availability of pornography on the Internet has made young 
men ―ultimately less libidinous.‖102 While some undoubtedly persist in 
their claims about the bad effects of pornography,
103
 the modern view of 
nonchild pornography is more nuanced and tolerant.
104
  
 
 
 97. For some studies that have purported to identify a relationship between exposure to sexual 
images and aggression, see Mike Allen et al., A Meta-Analysis Summarizing the Effects of 
Pornography II: Aggression After Exposure, 22 HUM. COMM. RES. 258 (1995); Mike Allen et al., 
Exposure to Pornography and Acceptance of Rape Myths, 45 J. COMM. 5, 19 (1995) (reporting that 
―exposure to pornography, at least in experimental settings, increases the acceptance of rape myths‖). 
Such studies have been criticized as failing to predict actual human behavior. See, e.g., AGGRESSION: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEWS 31 (Russell G. Green & Edward I. Donnerstein eds., 1983); 
EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 72 (1987); Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1635, 1665 (2005); William K. Layman, Violent Pornography and the Obscenity Doctrine: The 
Road Not Taken, 75 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1491 (1987); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “the” 
Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1182 (1993); see also Bridget J. Crawford, 
Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of 
Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 136 n.203 (2007) (noting this disagreement). 
 98. E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
171–74 (1987). 
 99. E.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24–25 (1981) (claiming 
that pornography encourages men to be sexually violent and that women are the principal victims of 
this violence). 
 100. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, 40 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 36 (Oct. 21, 
1993) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993)); Strossen, supra note 97, at 
1176–85. 
 101. Strossen, supra note 97, at 1185. 
 102. Naomi Wolf, The Porn Myth, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 20, 2003, at 36, available at http://nymag. 
com/nymetro/news/trends/n_9437/. 
 103. E.g., Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why Miller Should 
Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 613 (2008) (arguing that ―one may reasonably 
conclude that pornography consumption has negative impacts‖). 
 104. The modern tolerance of adult pornography may, at least in part, be attributable to our ability 
to observe that the dramatic increase in availability has not led to the ill effects that pornography‘s 
critics foretold. Despite tremendously easy access to pornography since the advent of the Internet, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
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There is one recent study that purports to demonstrate a link between 
individuals who possess child pornography and those who sexually abuse 
children, but it does not satisfy the retributive-limited preventative 
punishment model. A 2009 article claims that child pornography 
possessors are merely sexual abusers of children whose contact offenses 
have gone undetected. It reports that ―the vast majority of the participants‖ 
in the study ―report that they committed acts of hands-on abuse prior to 
seeking child pornography via the Internet.‖105 If child pornography 
offenders are seeking out pornography only after sexually abusing 
children, then increasing the punishment for possessing child 
pornography—indeed, even making child pornography fully unavailable—
will not protect children from sexual abuse.
106
 
Finally, even if future social science data were to demonstrate a causal 
relationship between possession of child pornography and future contact 
offenses, it would support lengthy sentences for possession, but it would 
not support punishing those convicted of possession more severely than 
those convicted of child sex abuse. From a retributive standpoint, such 
practices raise serious proportionality concerns, as they would be akin to 
punishing a felon in possession of a firearm more harshly than a defendant 
who commits armed robbery or punishing drunk driving more harshly than 
vehicular homicide. These practices might also raise odd deterrence 
problems because a rational actor deciding between whether to collect 
child pornography or sexually abuse children would have an incentive to 
choose the latter.
107
 And in order for such practices to be justified from an 
 
 
rates of sexual violence have not seen corresponding increases. To the contrary, incidents of rape have 
declined since the early 1990s and have remained stable in recent years. See Violent Crime Trends, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/viortrdtab.cfm (last 
updated on Jan. 22, 2011). The modern tolerance of adult pornography may also be attributable to a 
commonsense understanding that people may find certain images sexually exciting, and yet not 
actually want to engage in similar behavior. For example, a happily married person might watch a 
pornographic movie featuring casual extramarital sex and find that movie exciting without any desire 
to cheat on his or her spouse. There may be any number of explanations for this phenomenon—
perhaps tied to repression or the complex role of fantasy—but the idea that people may be excited by a 
pornographic movie and yet never wish to recreate the situation from the movie in their own lives 
seems uncontroversial. 
 105. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The „Butner Study‟ Redux: A Report of the 
Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 
183, 189 (2009). 
 106. Of course, one could argue that if such offenders are incarcerated for viewing child 
pornography, although their imprisonment may not help their initial victims, they may be prevented 
from committing any future offenses. But such an argument is really one about proxy punishment 
(rather than preventative punishment), and as discussed in the subsequent section, there are serious 
flaws with the proxy punishment model. 
 107. Cf. Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 
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incapacitation perspective, those who possess child pornography would 
have to pose a greater risk of future contact offenses than those who have 
already committed contact offenses, which seems unlikely.
108
 
C. Proxy Punishment 
The proxy punishment argument is quite difficult to defend. It is not a 
well-accepted justification for punishment, probably because punishing 
someone for conduct that has not been proven raises serious due process 
concerns. At the very least, the premise underlying the proxy punishment 
argument—that all possessors of child pornography have also committed a 
past contact offense—requires strong empirical support, and that support 
does not exist.  
1. Identifying the Argument 
While the preventative punishment argument justifies lengthening child 
pornography possession sentences on the ground that it reduces the risk of 
future instances of child sex abuse, the proxy punishment argument 
justifies the longer sentences on the theory that such sentences penalize 
past undetected instances of child sex abuse. As a general matter, proxy 
punishment is imposed when three conditions are met: (a) the ―real‖ (i.e., 
more serious) crime is too difficult to prosecute, (b) the ―proxy‖ (i.e., less 
serious) crime is easier to prosecute, and (c) those who are committing the 
―proxy‖ crime have also committed the ―real‖ crime.109 In the child 
pornography context, punishment is increased for possessing child 
pornography because convictions for child sex abuse are more difficult to 
obtain than child pornography convictions
110
 and because those who 
 
 
1173–80 (2004) (describing how adjustments in punishment levels for a particular crime may lead to 
substitution effects).  
 108. See Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 87, at 820 (noting that ―evidence does not support the 
proposition that there is a strong connection between being a child pornography offender and 
committing sexual molestation‖; however, ―if a person has committed a child sex offense, then the use 
of pornography may constitute an additional risk factor for re-offending‖). 
 109. Others have defined proxy crimes in a slightly different fashion, defining the proxy behavior 
as ordinarily not blameworthy or criminal. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of 
Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 912 (2004) (defining ―proxy crimes‖ as ―offenses that are not 
blameworthy in themselves, but that stand in for more culpable activities‖); Jeannie Suk, Criminal 
Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2006) (characterizing ―presence at home‖ when subject to an 
order of protection as a ―proxy‖ for domestic violence, and noting that presence in a home ―is not 
generally criminal‖). That definition does not work in the context of child pornography, as there is 
widespread agreement that viewing child pornography is blameworthy. O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra 
note 1, at 153 (―Today, few would question the value of outlawing child pornography.‖). 
 110. See MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] DISENTANGLING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 881 
 
 
 
 
possess child pornography are assumed to have also sexually abused 
children. 
There are a number of reasons that child sex abuse cases are more 
difficult to prosecute than possession of child pornography cases. First, 
child sex abuse is, as a general matter, difficult to detect
111—often because 
it is a crime that ordinarily occurs in private spaces
112
 and also because 
offenders threaten their victims into silence.
113
 In contrast, law 
enforcement can detect those who possess child pornography by tracing IP 
addresses of those who visit pornographic sites or by engaging in sting 
operations.
114
 Second, once child sex abuse is detected, there are 
evidentiary problems associated with pursuing many child sex abuse 
cases. Prosecutors are often faced with a lack of physical evidence, 
problems with the credibility of child witnesses, or the unwillingness of 
the victim‘s family to have their child suffer through the trauma of a 
trial.
115
 Similar issues rarely arise in possession of child pornography cases 
because, once law enforcement obtains a warrant and seizes an offender‘s 
computer, the prosecution essentially has all the evidence it needs to 
obtain a conviction and need not worry about victim credibility or about a 
victim‘s unwillingness to testify.116 
 
 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 5 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD 
SEX EXPLOITATION] (2006 conviction rate for child pornography was 95%; 2006 conviction rate for 
child sex abuse was 86%); see also WOLAK ET AL., supra note 70, at 29 (noting that ―conviction rates 
may be higher for Internet-related [child pornography] possession cases than for conventional child-
sexual-victimization cases‖). 
 111. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG 
CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS 11 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf 
[hereinafter SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN] (reporting a 27% arrest rate); TIM TATE, CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY: AN INVESTIGATION 109–10 (1990) (suggesting that only 1% of all child sex abusers 
are ―caught and sentenced‖). 
 112. See SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 111, at 6 (―Most (70%) of the sexual 
assaults reported to law enforcement occurred in the residence of the victim, the offender, or the 
residence of another individual.‖). 
 113. See, e.g., FURNISS, supra note 61, at 24, 39. 
 114. Cf. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 70, at 13 (reporting that 43% of U.S. child pornography 
possession cases in 2000 ―originated with investigations by law enforcement‖). 
 115. For example, in 2006, federal prosecutors declined to prosecute more than half of the child 
sex abuse cases that were referred to them, as opposed to only a 38% declination rate for child 
pornography referrals, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION, supra note 110, at tbl.2, 
and the reasons given for declining prosecution were more likely to be concerns about weak evidence 
in child sex abuse cases than in child pornography cases, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX 
EXPLOITATION, supra note 110, at 3 (―More than half of sex abuse declinations were due to weak 
evidence. In comparison, weak evidence was stated as the reason for 24% of declinations for child 
pornography and 20% of declinations for sex transportation.‖). 
 116. See Dan Herbeck, Child Porn Suspect Faces Risk with Trial, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 6, 2009, 
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There are a number of examples where government officials tacitly 
acknowledge that child pornography laws are being used as a proxy for 
punishing child sex abusers.
117
 They often appear in the guise of 
statements that possessors of child pornography also have a history of 
contact offenses
118
 or statements noting how difficult it is to detect or 
prosecute child sex abuse cases.
119
 Such statements, when made in support 
of longer sentences for possession of child pornography, indicate that 
lawmakers are using pornography prosecutions as an alternative to sex 
abuse prosecutions. If possessors were being punished only for viewing 
these images, such statements would be irrelevant. Other public officials 
are more direct, making statements that refer to possessors of child 
pornography as ―predators‖ or in other terms that suggest contact 
offenses.
120
 
2. Problems With the Argument 
Unlike preventative punishment, which is common in the modern 
criminal justice system, there are few other examples of proxy punishment 
 
 
at A1 (reporting high levels of plea bargains for child pornography possession and noting that the few 
defendants who proceed to trial are almost always convicted). 
 117. See, e.g., AKDENIZ, supra note 42, at 109 (identifying the importance of ―prosecutions 
against child pornographers who are frequently child molesters‖ (quoting statement of Rep. Lamar S. 
Smith)); GELBER, supra note 40, at 6–7 (recounting statistical and anecdotal evidence to support idea 
―that consumers of child pornography may also be child contact offenders‖ and disputing that a 
possession offender‘s lack of criminal history is exculpatory because ―the silent and secret nature of 
sex crime in general (particularly with a vulnerable population such as children) protect defendants 
from detection by law enforcement‖); TATE, supra note 111, at 102 (recounting the views of an FBI 
agent and an Assistant U.S. Attorney that possessors of child pornography ―are men interested in 
having sex with children—men who are willing if given the right opportunity to have sex with 
children‖); Sher & Carey, supra note 2 (noting that, in response to reports of a study which found a 
high rate of unreported contact offenses by those convicted of possessing child pornography, ―[s]ome 
prosecutors say they could use the study to argue for stiffer sentences‖). 
 118. See, e.g., USSC 1996 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 67, at i (―[A] significant portion of 
child pornography offenders have a criminal history that involves the sexual abuse or exploitation of 
children . . . .‖). 
 119. See, e.g., Arizona State Senate, Minutes of Judiciary Committee (Mar. 29, 1983) (on file with 
author) (including testimony by a prosecutor explaining that she encounters problems in convicting 
child molesters, and thus the legislature should pass legislation to criminalize the possession child 
pornography). 
 120. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H10,241, H10,248–49 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of 
Rep. Schultz) (asserting that ―to prevent predators from hurting other children‖ it is necessary to ―go 
back through the Internet and get them‖ and recounting statistics on child pornography); 154 CONG. 
REC. E2087 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Biggert) (characterizing those ―who use the 
Internet to transmit or access child pornography‖ as ―predators‖); see also 152 CONG. REC. H5705, 
H5724–25 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Pence) (asserting that ―child pornography is the 
fuel that fires the wicked hearts of child predators‖). 
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in criminal law.
121
 There are, of course, instances where prosecutors seek a 
conviction for a lesser crime when the evidence in a particular case does 
not allow them to successfully prosecute a defendant for a greater crime—
a practice that is sometimes referred to as ―pretextual prosecution.‖122 The 
seminal example was the Department of Justice‘s decision to prosecute Al 
Capone for tax evasion rather than for his many violent crimes.
123
 But 
these pretextual prosecutions are different in kind from proxy 
punishment.
124
 Pretextual prosecutions involve prosecutors seeking 
convictions for lesser crimes that—while perhaps not uniformly 
 
 
 121. It has been difficult to identify other instances of proxy punishment. Possession of burglary 
tools seems like a promising candidate—it criminalizes the possession of certain tools and instruments, 
and one could presume that this prohibition is designed to help law enforcement who cannot 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular individual actually committed a burglary. 
However, statutes criminalizing the possession of burglary tools require prosecutors to prove an 
intention to use the tools to commit a burglary. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 466 (West 1999); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 266, § 49 (West 2000) (similar); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a)–(d) (West 2005); 
8 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 907(b) (West 2006). The generally accepted justification for these laws is to 
―enabl[e] enforcement authorities to act before the prospective burglar has had the opportunity to 
gather his tools, weapons, and plans and strike in secret.‖ Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Statutes Relating to Burglars‟ Tools, 33 A.L.R.3D 798, § 2(a) (1970). In other words, 
such statutes are designed to permit police to arrest suspected burglars before ordinary attempt 
doctrine would permit liability. Thus, it appears that these statutes are designed, not as proxy crimes, 
but instead as preventive crimes. Another candidate for possible proxy crimes is possession of 
narcotics with the intent to distribute. But it appears that such statutes simply serve to increase 
sentences for those individuals who possess significant amounts of controlled substances, and the 
―intent to distribute‖ language may thus ultimately be irrelevant. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006) 
(making it unlawful ―to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance‖ and specifying the sentencing ranges available based on 
certain minimum amounts of various controlled substances), with 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006) (making it 
―unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance‖ containing no 
minimum amounts and assigning shorter sentencing ranges than § 841). The best example of proxy 
punishment in modern criminal law appears to be prohibitions regarding the possession and sale of 
drug paraphernalia. Some states do not require the prosecutor to demonstrate that the distributor or the 
recipient intended to use the illegal objects to ingest illegal drugs. See, e.g., State v. Holway, 644 
N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 2002); Morrison v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 724 (Va. Ct. App. 2002). But the 
commonsense understanding regarding drug paraphernalia prohibitions is that they are used to punish 
those involved in drug consumption or sale. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Johnson, The Constitutionality of 
Drug Paraphernalia Laws, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 582 n.6 (1981) (noting that ―in many cases, 
observation of illegal drug paraphernalia provided police officers with probable cause to arrest the 
possessor, consequently justifying an ‗incidental‘ search of the suspect's person,‖ which ―would often 
uncover illegal drugs‖); see generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 516–19 (2001) (identifying drug paraphernalia laws and noting that these laws 
(and others) are designed to make it easier for law enforcement ―to enforce the original crime, but 
more cheaply, by enforcing the substitutes‖).  
 122. See generally Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2004); Daniel C. 
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone‟s Revenge: An  Essay on the Political Economy of 
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005). 
 123. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 122, at 583–84. 
 124. See Suk, supra note 109, at 19–20 (distinguishing between proxy crimes and pretextual 
prosecutions). 
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enforced
125—are not always associated with the greater crime that is 
difficult to prove.  
Proxy punishment, in contrast, is a more systematic decision by 
legislatures to criminalize and to pursue convictions for conduct that is 
easier to prove than the conduct which the legislature ultimately aims to 
prohibit. The systematic nature of proxy punishment, as compared to 
pretextual prosecutions, results in the easier-to-prove crime becoming 
inextricably associated with the crime that is difficult to prove.
126
 So, for 
example, a newspaper report that an individual had been convicted for the 
possession of child pornography would lead many readers to conclude that 
the individual had also sexually abused a child.
127
 This association of child 
pornography possession with child sex abuse may affect not only public 
perception but also legislative response. If legislators perceive that only 
those individuals who already have abused a child are being convicted for 
possessing child pornography, then they might adjust the criminal 
sanctions associated with child pornography to reflect the harm 
attributable to child sex abuse. In contrast, legislatures would not adjust 
the penalties associated with tax evasion to account for the other harms 
caused by organized crime, because there is no shared understanding that 
tax evasion is always connected with organized crime activities, pretextual 
prosecution of mobsters for tax offenses notwithstanding. 
The major flaw with proxy punishment should be immediately 
apparent. Even if some—or many—of those who possess child 
pornography also abuse children, we ought not punish all possessors for 
such abuse without actually proving that they have committed a contact 
offense. To do otherwise would run directly counter to notions of due 
process and fairness in the criminal justice system.
128
 It would permit the 
criminal punishment of individuals without any of the constitutional 
protections afforded to criminal defendants, such as the right to a jury trial, 
the presumption of innocence, and the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 125. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 122, at 589–90. 
 126. See Suk, supra note 109, at 20 (noting that ―whereas pretextual conduct is unrelated to its 
target crime,‖ a proxy crime ―is not considered to be unrelated to the target crime,‖ but rather is 
―tightly linked‖ to the difficult to prove crime ―in that where the former is found, the latter is thought 
to follow‖). 
 127. In contrast, although prosecutors may sometimes use the crime of tax evasion to convict 
gangsters like Al Capone, a newspaper report that an individual had been convicted of tax evasion 
would not lead readers to conclude that the individual was also guilty of mob-related activities. 
 128. Cf. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
783–84 (1997) (characterizing the ―proxying function‖ as ―an evasion of our normal requirements of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt‖). 
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The pernicious character of proxy punishment becomes clear when we 
consider an example outside of the child pornography context. Imagine 
that social science data can definitively prove that all males under the age 
of twenty-five in a particular geographic area have committed at least one 
violent crime, but the state is unable to provide proof of individual 
wrongdoing. We would not permit the state to punish those men unless the 
state could provide evidence that each individual had committed a 
particular crime. If we change these hypothetical situations so that a large 
percentage (rather than all) of a population committed a crime, then the 
outcome seems even more outrageous, as some people who had not 
committed a crime would be punished in order to get at the large 
percentage of those who did. 
Put in a context other than child sex abuse, the arguments for this type 
of proxy punishment—that is, the ―we didn‘t catch you, but we know you 
probably did it‖ variety—seem entirely unpersuasive. They are little more 
than bad parodies of utilitarian arguments about public safety.
129
  
But even if we were to ignore the due process concerns associated with 
the proxy punishment argument, the empirical support for the proxy 
punishment model simply does not exist. A recent study by the National 
Center for Missing & Exploited Children, for example, reported that in 
eighty-four percent of child pornography possession cases, ―investigators 
did not detect concurrent child sexual victimization or attempts at child 
victimization.‖130 Although some social science data appear more 
supportive of the proxy crime model,
131
 that data is drawn from 
 
 
 129. Indeed, the argument looks more like preventative detention than punishment, and 
preventative detention is a concept that has been subject to significant criticism. See Paul H. Robinson, 
The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1089, 1100–03 (2010) (discussing political upheavals in the 1970s surrounding proposals for open 
preventive detention and concluding that the modern criminal justice system does not openly admit to 
seeking preventive detention ends). 
 130. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 70, at 17. 
 131. One study of 155 pornography offenders in a federal prison from 2002 to 2005 documented a 
dramatic increase in the self reporting by offenders as to whether they had also sexually abused a 
child. See Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 105. At the time of sentencing, 115 subjects had no 
documented contact offenses, but at the end of an intensive treatment program, only twenty-four 
maintained that they had not also committed contact offenses. Id. at 187. The authors had nine of the 
twenty-four offenders who denied contact offenses submit to a polygraph test, and seven of the nine 
failed. Id. Even assuming that polygraph evidence is completely reliable, this study still suggests that 
there is not a perfect correlation between those convicted of possessing child pornography and those 
who have committed contact offenses. Notably, this study has been characterized as ―controversial,‖ 
and one commentator has noted that ―[t]he study was withdrawn before peer review because of 
questions about the authenticity of the prisoner responses.‖ Hansen, supra note 40, at 59. As the New 
York Times reported, the authors ―submitted the paper to The Journal of Family Violence, a widely 
read peer-reviewed publication in the field, and it was accepted. But in a letter obtained by The Times, 
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individuals who have been convicted of child pornography or contact 
offenses and who volunteered to participate in social science studies.
132
 To 
support the proxy punishment model, it would be necessary to prove that 
all individuals who possess child pornography also sexually abuse 
children. This seems unlikely to occur because, at the very least, it is 
difficult to identify everyone who views child pornography. Given the 
sentencing exposure for such behavior, social scientists are limited to 
studying those individuals who have already been convicted.
133
 
In any event, even if empirical evidence supporting the proxy 
punishment argument did exist, it would not support imposing longer 
sentences on those who possess child pornography than on those 
defendants who have actually been convicted of sexually abusing a child. 
To impose longer sentences on those who have not yet been convicted of a 
contact offense—but are suspected to have committed that crime—than on 
those who actually have been convicted of that crime would stand the 
concept of due process on its head and render the procedural protections 
associated with criminal convictions essentially meaningless.  
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF EQUATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
WITH SEX ABUSE 
As should be clear from the previous section, the crime-control 
assumptions underlying the preventative punishment argument and the 
proxy punishment argument are not supported by empirical evidence. In 
addition to the lack of support for the assertion that increasing sentences 
for child pornography offenders will reduce child sex abuse, there are 
independent reasons that counsel against blurring the distinction between 
possession of child pornography and child sex abuse. Specifically, 
characterizing sentencing decisions for possession of child pornography as 
combating child sex abuse may promote misperceptions about who 
 
 
Judi Garrett, an official of the Bureau of Prisons, requested that the editors of the journal withdraw the 
study, because it did not meet ‗agency approval.‘‖ Sher & Carey, supra note 2. The Times further 
reported that ―[t]he findings, based on offenders serving prison time who volunteered for the study, do 
not necessarily apply to the large and diverse group of adults who have at some point downloaded 
child pornography, and whose behavior is far too variable to be captured by a single survey.‖ Id. The 
study has since been published. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 105. 
 132. See Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 105, at 185. Thus, as noted above, there are concerns 
that the study participants are not a representative sample of child pornography possessors. See supra 
note 90. 
 133. Indeed, the only study of nonconvicted offenders—the anonymous Internet study discussed 
in Part II.B.2—indicates that many individuals who possess child pornography do not commit contact 
offenses. See supra notes 90–92. 
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commits child sex abuse and misperceptions about the effectiveness of 
current policing and prosecution efforts directed at that abuse. These 
misperceptions may, in turn, negatively affect society‘s ability to prevent 
and punish child sex abuse. 
A. Misperceiving Child Sex Abuse as a Stranger Crime 
One of the most pervasive misperceptions about child sex abuse is that 
it is a crime perpetrated by strangers.
134
 People generally tend to equate 
fear of violent crime with fear of strangers.
135
 This holds true for sex 
crimes against children.
136
 Children are repeatedly told that they should 
not talk to strangers,
137
 and some of the most well-publicized cases of 
child sex abuse were committed by strangers.
138
 But child sex abuse does 
not conform to this common stereotype about violent crimes. The vast 
majority of child molestation offenses are committed by non-strangers. 
Offenses by strangers account for only seven percent of all cases of child 
sex abuse.
139
 The sex abuse inherent in the creation of child pornography 
appears to follow this same pattern of misperception. There is (or has 
been) a misperception that the victims of child pornography are either 
runaways or kidnapped for sex,
140
 but, in reality, the children are usually 
 
 
 134. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War Against Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 453–54 (2010) (discussing the ―stranger danger‖ myth). 
 135. See Robert J. Sampson, Personal Violence By Strangers: An Extension and Test of the 
Opportunity Model of Predatory Victimization, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328 (1987) (―[I]t 
is the possibility of attack by strangers that seems to engender the most intense feelings of 
vulnerability and fear. . . . [T]he general public tends to ‗equate strange with dangerous‘. . . .‖ (quoting 
C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (1978))); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 343, 346–47 (2007) (noting 
the conventional wisdom ―that crimes between strangers are more serious than crimes between those 
who already know each other‖ and noting that ―many of the arguments in support of treating stranger 
violence more seriously are based on specific assumptions unique to strangers‖). 
 136. ―The public, limited by its general lack of knowledge about sex offenses, has miscalculated 
the risk to its children from strangers. As a result, the public has misdirected the bulk of its fear toward 
strangers.‖ Amber Leigh Bagley, “An Era of Human Zoning”: Banishing Sex Offenders From 
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347, 1377–78 (2008). 
 137. E.g., Safety Around Strangers, COALITION FOR CHILDREN, http://www.safechild.org/ 
strangers.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
 138. See Bagley, supra note 136, at 1378. 
 139. Hessick, supra note 135, at 356–57. Approximately 34% of child molestation offenders were 
family members and 59% were acquaintances. Id. at 357. For more detailed information by victim 
gender and age, see SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 111, at 10 tbl.7. 
 140. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2405, H2432 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (asserting that ―children are abducted and sold into the sex industry for both 
pornography and for prostitution‖); see also TATE, supra note 111, at 20 (noting the misperception 
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seduced into posing for these pictures or videos by someone they knew.
141
 
Despite the fact that strangers are rarely the instigators of child sex 
abuse, the public discussion about child sex abuse is framed almost 
entirely in terms of protecting children from strangers. The public and 
political drive behind the enactment of Megan‘s Law provides an excellent 
example of this phenomenon.
142
 The proponents of sex offender 
registration laws recounted stories of young children who were sexually 
assaulted and killed by strangers. A small number of legislators noted that 
most child sex abuse occurs within the family and by other non-strangers 
and further noted that the offender registration would do nothing to 
prevent those offenses.
143
 Yet sex offender registration laws were widely 
adopted across the country without any modification to account for the 
sexual abuse of non-strangers. 
People do not want to think that children are sexually abused at the 
hands of those who are supposed to protect them. Nor do people want to 
admit that they or their children may be at risk from friends and family.
144
 
But the unfortunate reality is that child sex abuse is often a messy 
intrafamilial problem. And when prosecutors try to bring cases of child 
sex abuse against, for example, a child‘s relative or a friend of the family, 
they will sometimes find that the family members side with the offender, 
rather than with the victim.
145
 
 
 
―that the victims of child pornography—especially the very young—are either runaways or kidnapped 
for sex‖). 
 141. ―In some cases their own parents took the pictures or made them available for others to take 
the pictures.‖ TATE, supra note 111, at 20; see also O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 53 
(recounting specific incidents of parents abusing their own children and distributing images recording 
the abuse); U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, USE OF GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 36 (reporting that 
52.3% of federal defendants convicted of producing child pornography in 2008 had their sentences 
increased because they were a parent, relative, or legal guardian of the minor depicted or the minor 
was otherwise in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant); Duncan T. Brown, 
Pornography After the Fall of the CPPA: Strategies for Prosecutors, 15 NAT‘L CTR. FOR 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE UPDATE, no. 4 (2002) (―Because creating child pornography requires 
a level of trust between the victim and the pornographer, often the victims are physically or, through 
coercion or secrecy, emotionally close to the defendant.‖). 
 142. For an excellent account of the legislative debate surrounding Megan‘s Law, see Daniel M. 
Filler, Making the Case for Megan‟s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001). 
 143. Id. at 344. 
 144. Cf. Hessick, supra note 135, at 345 & n.7 (noting that, despite the higher rate of nonstranger 
violence, social science evidence indicates that people believe they are significantly more likely to be 
shot or badly hurt by a stranger than hit by their spouse or partner). 
 145. See, e.g., NAT‘L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 94 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that in intrafamily sex abuse cases, the 
nonoffending parent ―may protect the child, pressure the child not to talk about the abuse, or persuade 
the child to recant the disclosure so the perpetrator does not face the criminal justice system‖); see also 
FURNISS, supra note 61, at 37 (discussing reasons why a nonabusing parent may not want to seek 
assistance). 
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Those who possess child pornography do not present such problems. 
They often possess pictures of children they have never met. And when we 
engage in preventative or proxy punishment, we can do so without asking 
who took the pictures of the children or which children are at risk. Because 
pornography convictions do not require an acknowledgement of the 
ugliness associated with non-stranger sex abuse, society may prefer to 
punish those who possess child pornography over those who abuse 
children. Punishing pornography (as opposed to contact offenses) allows 
us to persist in our misconception that children are at risk of sex abuse 
from a stranger looking at pictures on a computer rather than from the 
children‘s own circles of family and friends. 
The misperception that child sex abuse is ordinarily committed by 
strangers may have negative effects on the prevention and punishment of 
child sex abuse.
146
 It may lead policy makers to focus their efforts on 
measures aimed at reducing the number of contact offenses by strangers—
measures like Megan‘s Law—rather than on contact offenses by non-
strangers. But such measures have not significantly reduced rates of child 
sex abuse.
147
 Indeed, a recent study of sex offense rates in New Jersey 
after the implementation of Megan‘s Law suggests that the legislation has 
reduced neither the number of re-arrests for sex offenses nor the 
proportion of child molestation or incest as compared to other sex 
offenses. Nor has it demonstrably reduced the number of victims.
148
 
―Researchers studying the impact of registration and notification laws in 
other states have found similar results.‖149 And even if policies aimed at 
stranger offenses were successful, because strangers make up such a small 
percentage of child sex offenses, reducing the rate of contact offenses by 
 
 
 146. See Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 651, 685 (2008) (arguing that ―modeling sexual offender statutes on the stereotypical sexual 
predator may have a perverse effect of reducing the effectiveness of the criminal law in some 
significant number of cases‖ because, inter alia, ―[m]ost abusers are not strangers to their victims‖). 
 147. See Kari Melkonian, Comment, Michigan‟s Sex Offender Registration Act: Does it Make 
Communities Safer? The Implications of the Inclusion of a Broad Range of Offenders, a Review of 
Statutory Amendments and Thoughts on Future Changes, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 355, 371 (2007) 
(―[I]t seems that efforts like Megan‘s Law and Michigan‘s SORA have been misdirected and do little 
to address the real problems, which are (1) sexual assault by family members or acquaintances, not 
strangers, and (2) repeat offenders.‖). 
 148. KRISTEN M. ZGOBA & KAREN BACHAR, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NAT‘L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: LIMITED EFFECTS IN NEW JERSEY (2009), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225402.pdf. Although sex offense rates in New Jersey 
decreased after the passage of Megan‘s Law, sex offense rates in New Jersey have been on a consistent 
downward trend since 1985, and the ―greatest rate of decline for sex offending occurred prior to 1994 
[before the passage and implementation of Megan‘s Law] and the least rate of decline occurred after 
1995.‖ Id. at 1. 
 149. Id.  
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strangers is likely to have a smaller effect on the overall number of child 
sex abuse crimes than a measure aimed at intrafamily or other non-
stranger offenders. 
The stranger-danger misperception may also keep parents from taking 
the most effective preventative measures to protect their children.
150
 
Imagine the mother who thinks her children are at risk only (or primarily) 
from strangers. She might keep a close eye on her children when they are 
at a park, but never ask her child why he or she does not want to visit a 
certain relative. She would have successfully protected her children from 
strangers because that is where she perceived the risk, but she would not 
have noticed a possible warning sign of non-stranger abuse.
151
 
B. Misperceptions About Law Enforcement Statistics 
In addition to perpetuating misperceptions about who engages in child 
sex abuse, the modern discussion surrounding child pornography also 
creates misperceptions about law enforcement‘s detection and prosecution 
of child sex abuse cases. Specifically, current reporting methods present 
child pornography prosecutions in a format that may mislead the public 
into overestimating law enforcement‘s success combating child sex abuse. 
Child sex abuse is an underdetected, and thus underprosecuted, crime. If 
the public believes that law enforcement is effectively prosecuting child 
sex abuse, then there may be no political pressure on law enforcement to 
develop more effective techniques to detect and prevent child sex abuse. 
Use of the term ―child sexual exploitation‖ may contribute to these 
misperceptions. That term encompasses a wide range of activities, from 
the possession of child pornography to the sexual molestation of 
children.
152
 When arrest and prosecution statistics are reported using the 
 
 
 150. ―Encouraging society to focus on stranger danger without also addressing the significant 
risks to children from family members and friends will keep parents from fully understanding the risks 
to their children. . . . [F]amily members and friends may find they have increased access to children in 
restricted, less-supervised areas. The false sense of security . . . could lead to increased risks to 
children.‖ Bagley, supra note 136, at 1380; cf. O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 216 (―Parents 
are regularly warned about the increasing dangers of predatory paedophiles and could be forgiven for 
believing that their children are at significant risk of abduction or online seduction. Yet, the majority 
of child sexual abuse incidents involve acquaintances or family members and the Internet plays no 
part.‖). 
 151. See Kathy Smedley, Signs of Sexual Abuse, PROTECTKIDS.COM, http://www.protectkids.com/ 
abuse/abusesigns.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (noting that ―[i]ndicating a sudden reluctance to be 
alone with a certain person‖ is a ―possible . . . behavioral indicator[] of child sexual abuse‖). 
 152. E.g., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION, supra note 110, at 1 (defining 
―[f]ederal child sex exploitation offenses‖ to include ―child pornography, sex transportation, and sex 
abuse‖); FAQ: Child Sexual Exploitation, NAT‘L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 
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term ―exploitation,‖ it obscures whether the offenses at issue are contact 
offenses or noncontact offenses, such as the possession of child 
pornography. This can be seen in Department of Justice press releases 
touting the high number of arrests by the federal Internet Crimes Against 
Children task force program.
153
 Local law enforcement have engaged in 
similar reporting tactics.
154
 Potential for misperception is compounded 
when reports refer to those arrested as ―predators‖ or ―pedophiles,‖ as 
those terms connote that the individual arrested poses an immediate risk to 
children.
155
 
If these reporting methods mislead the public into believing that the 
arrest and prosecution rates associated with child pornography possession 
are instead associated with child sex abuse, then it may reduce political 
pressure for law enforcement to successfully detect and prosecute contact 
offenses. This is especially troubling because the number of child 
pornography offenses appears to be much lower than other sex offenses 
involving children.
156
 Moreover, because child sex abuse cases are so 
much more difficult to detect and to prosecute than child pornography 
 
 
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=281
5 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (defining term as including ―Possession, Manufacture, and Distribution of 
Child Pornography; Enticement of Children for Sexual Acts; Child Prostitution; Child Sex Tourism; 
Child Sexual Molestation‖). There appears to be a movement within the child advocacy community to 
use the term ―child sexual exploitation‖ as a substitute for ―child pornography‖ because the latter term 
is thought to insufficiently ―describe the true nature and extent of sexually exploitive images of child 
victims.‖ WOLAK ET AL., supra note 70, at vii n.1. 
 153. See, e.g., DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET SUPPORTING STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2001–2008 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
newsroom/pressreleases/2008/psc08-993.htm (describing the Internet Crimes Against Children 
(ICAC) task force program, which ―supports law enforcement‘s efforts to prevent, investigate, and 
stop computer-facilitated child sexual exploitation‖ and discussing arrest rates); DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
FACT SHEET: PROJECT SAFE CHILDHOOD (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/ 
pressreleases/2008/doj08845.htm (describing arrest rates and funding amounts for the ICAC program 
in efforts to stop ―sexual crimes against children‖). 
 154. E.g., Dan Miller, Child Exploitation Units Apprehend Online Predators, COUNTY NEWS 
(Wash., D.C.), Feb. 14, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.naco.org/newsroom/countynews/archives/ 
documents/2005/cnews-feb14-05.pdf. 
 155. See, e.g., Deborah J. Daniels, Remarks at the Conference on Child and Family Maltreatment 
(Jan. 28, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/archives/speeches/2004/confonchild 
abuse.htm) (reporting arrest rates for ―Internet-based child sexual exploitation‖ and noting that every 
―such arrest means that untold numbers of innocent children will be protected from abuse‖ at the hands 
of ―pedophiles‖); see also Miller, supra note 154 (describing a person who sends child pornography as 
a ―predator‖). 
 156. See DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 6 (2004), available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204911.pdf (―Crimes involving pornography and juvenile 
victims . . . are relatively infrequent . . . . [T]he estimated 2,900 incidents in 2000 are dwarfed by 
reports of overall sex crimes against juveniles, which can be roughly estimated at 269,000 for the same 
period.‖). 
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cases,
157
 police and prosecutors may have an incentive to devote more 
resources to pornography cases than to contact offense cases.
158
 
Effectively preventing contact offenses, especially contact offenses 
involving offenders who have preexisting relationships with their victims, 
will require law enforcement to look outside conventional crime-
prevention measures. Because most contact offenses occur in private 
places,
159
 popular crime-control measures, such as putting more police on 
the streets, are unlikely to deter offenders.
160
 Unlike the child pornography 
context, where police can use proactive methods such as sting operations, 
law enforcement relies on reports of sexual abuse for detection.
161
 And 
because contact offenders prey on the shame or fear of their victims,
162
 
reports of abuse are infrequent.
163
 
This is not to say that contact offenses are too difficult to prevent or to 
detect; rather, it suggests that different techniques may be necessary. For 
example, to increase detection, law enforcement could coordinate with 
schools and social workers to ensure that those children who fit the risk 
profile for child sex abuse are closely monitored.
164
 Increasing the 
prosecution level and profile of non-stranger contact offenses could help to 
deter future offenses.
165
 And, perhaps most importantly, increasing the 
 
 
 157. See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text; see also Ost, supra note 64, at 460. 
 158. Cf. William H. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1799, 1819–24 
(1998) (explaining that the cost of different enforcement strategies and scarce resources is a factor that 
results in law enforcement targeting of the street-level crack trade instead of more upscale drug 
markets). 
 159. See SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 111, at 6 (―Most (70%) of the sexual 
assaults reported to law enforcement occurred in the residence of the victim, the offender, or the 
residence of another individual.‖). 
 160. See Hessick, supra note 135, at 405–06. 
 161. See id. at 351 n.23 (―Because most violent crimes occur outside the view of law enforcement, 
an arrest can be made only if a crime is reported to the police.‖). 
 162. See, e.g., FURNISS, supra note 61, at 46. 
 163. See Catherine Rylyk, Note, Lest We Regress to the Dark Ages: Holding Voluntary Surgical 
Castration Cruel and Unusual, Even for Child Molesters, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1305, 1305 
n.5 (2008) (noting that ―child molestation remains one of the most underreported crimes‖ and that one 
study reported that less than eleven percent of all incidents are ever disclosed). 
 164. There is evidence that child sex abuse is correlated with a number of other factors, including 
poverty. See Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping in 
Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 83, 91 n.43 (2001) (noting that ―the 
risk factors that contribute to the incidence of child sexual abuse of children . . . include poverty, 
unemployment, familial stresses, and violence‖); Victor I. Vieth, In My Neighbor‟s House: A Proposal 
to Address Child Abuse in Rural America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 143, 143 (1998) (discussing the 
connection between child abuse and drug, alcohol, poverty, mental illness, and other social dilemmas 
in rural America); see also O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 226 (noting that ―child poverty, 
discrimination, early school leaving and marginalisation . . . diminish children‘s life chances and 
render them vulnerable to a myriad of harms, including sexual abuse‖). 
 165. See Hessick, supra note 135, at 407. 
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availability of secure, low-cost child care would help ensure that parents 
do not leave their children in the care of those who may sexually assault 
them.
166
 
If the public mistakenly believes that law enforcement is successfully 
combating child sex abuse, such changes may never occur. And because 
the misperceptions perpetuated by the modern approach to child 
pornography offenses may result in less attention and fewer resources 
being devoted to contact sex offenses against children, it raises the 
question whether those who are concerned about child sex abuse should 
support lengthier sentences for possession of child pornography. 
IV. TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
As this Article has explained, the recent trend in sentencing severity for 
possession of child pornography is at least partially attributable to 
arguments that blur the distinction between possessing child pornography 
and child sex abuse. But some of the legislation designed to increase 
sentences for possessing child pornography has resulted in situations 
where some individuals convicted of possession receive sentences that are 
longer than the sentences of those individuals convicted of child sex 
abuse. This section proposes several tentative reforms aimed at curbing the 
recent sentencing excesses. 
It is worth noting that the tentative suggestions offered below are 
aimed only at avoiding the most disproportionate sentences for those who 
possess child pornography and are specifically designed to ensure that 
child pornography possessors do not, in practice, end up serving longer 
sentences than those who sexually abuse children.
167
 These reforms are not 
 
 
 166. A recent story involving the sexual abuse of two small children by the babysitter that their 
single mom had hired to watch them while she worked weekends provides a sad example. The mother 
tried to do her own research into the babysitter‘s past on the Internet, but her search did not turn up his 
felony record or the fact that he had been incarcerated for more than six years. Kandra Wells, 
Molester‟s Sentence Leads to Cries of Injustice, MCALESTER NEWS-CAPITAL (S.E. Okla.), June 13, 
2009, available at  http://www.mcalesternews.com/homepage/local_story_164191511.html?keyword= 
leadpicturestory.  
 167. One might argue that my objections to the modern trend of increasing sentences for the 
possession of child pornography could be solved if legislatures simply increased the available 
sentences for child sex abuse, rather than eliminating some of the statutory features that currently 
result in longer sentences for possessors of child pornography. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 40, at 59 
(interviewing an Assistant U.S. Attorney who ―concedes that the typical [federal] penalties for child 
porn offenses tend to be more severe than those for contact offenses,‖ but stating that ―the solution is 
to increase the penalties for contact offenses, not to lower the penalties for child porn crimes‖). I 
would not consider that a satisfactory solution, as I also believe that many child pornography sentences 
are too severe in absolute terms. 
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designed to dramatically lower all sentences for possession of child 
pornography, both because the possession of child pornography is a 
serious offense worthy of punishment, and because this is an attempt to 
suggest reforms with at least a modest chance of success. 
Finally, it is important to note the lack of an accepted framework in the 
broader discussion about how to assess the severity of criminal sentences. 
The political atmosphere surrounding criminal justice ensures that 
legislators and other political actors speak almost exclusively in terms of 
why sentences should be increased.
168
 The Supreme Court‘s decision to 
essentially eliminate judicial review of length of sentence claims under the 
Eighth Amendment
169
 means that the judiciary—which is not subject to 
such political pressure—will not develop a framework for how to evaluate 
sentence lengths. And the academic literature, although replete with 
general discussions about proportionality in sentencing, has not filled the 
gap.
170
 The more general problem about how questions of sentencing 
severity ought to be publicly discussed and resolved is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Instead, these suggestions for reform are specifically 
designed to correct only the most egregiously severe sentencing practices 
in the child pornography context. 
A. Legislative Reforms 
One simple legislative reform is to treat those who possess child 
pornography differently from those who create it. Several jurisdictions 
impose identical sanctions for those who create these images and those 
who possess them.
171
 This punishment scheme neglects the important truth 
that the creation of child pornography is a much more serious crime than 
the possession of child pornography, as the creation involves the sexual 
abuse of a child.
172
 This simple reform would help avoid legislatures 
incidentally increasing the sentences for possession of child sex abuse 
when intending to increase sentences for those who are abusing 
children.
173
 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O‘Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The 
Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1980–
82 (2006); Stuntz, supra note 121, at 529–33.  
 169. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Rayburn, supra note 22, at 1123 (noting that ―arguments over the length of sentences are 
not the usual function of academic work‖). 
 171. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 172. See generally supra Part II.A.2. 
 173. See supra note 39. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] DISENTANGLING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 895 
 
 
 
 
A second reform would require legislatures to recognize that the 
Internet has complicated the traditional distinctions between possession, 
receipt, and distribution upon which many statutory schemes are built. For 
example, while federal law purports to treat possession of child 
pornography less severely than distribution or receipt, the way in which 
the Internet operates necessarily means that an individual who possesses 
an image from the Internet also received it.
174
 Thus, it makes little sense to 
punish receipt more severely than mere possession. What is more, in 
jurisdictions where legislatures distinguish between receipt and 
possession, defendants who obtained images via the Internet may receive 
the higher sentences associated with receipt in situations that legislators 
might have understood as simple possession. 
Distribution may also be less removed from possession and receipt in 
the Internet era. Before the advent of the Internet, an individual who 
distributed child pornography would have engaged in a series of deliberate 
acts, including physically copying the image,
175
 expending effort to 
identify interested recipients (such as taking out advertisements in 
pornographic magazines or otherwise actively attempting to meet others 
interested in acquiring child pornography), and physically mailing or 
otherwise transferring a package to the intended recipient.
176
 In the 
Internet era, an individual who possesses pornographic images on his or 
her computer and who visits a file-sharing site in order to obtain additional 
images may be classified as having ―distributed‖ images to countless 
individuals,
177
 even though there was no affirmative action on his or her 
part.
178
 These observations are not meant to minimize the harm associated 
with aiding the further circulation of child pornography, but rather to 
illustrate that distribution in the Internet age may be incidental to receipt. 
Many offenders in the Internet age simply do not resemble the image of 
the professional marketer and dealer conjured up by the term ―distribute.‖ 
Third, legislatures should examine whether the Internet has changed 
the blameworthiness or the risk profile of those who possess child 
 
 
 174. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). Of course, even in the non–Internet context, it is difficult to 
imagine circumstances where the government would have sufficient evidence to prove possession and 
not receipt. 
 175. This action would have required a significant effort in the days before easy access to 
technology such as digital scanners and CD burners. Pre–Internet distribution faced additional hurdles, 
including the deterioration of quality after more than a few copies. See O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra 
note 1, at 20, 88–89. 
 176. See SHELDON & HOWITT, supra note 2, at 38; TATE, supra note 111, at 242. 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 589 F.3d 520 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 178. See SHELDON & HOWITT, supra note 2, at 38. 
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pornography. While legislatures have undoubtedly increased sentences for 
possession of child pornography in direct response to the dramatic 
increase in availability,
179
 the ease of availability may also suggest that the 
individuals who access child pornography via computer may not be as 
blameworthy and may not pose the assumed risk to actual children as pre–
Internet offenders. Because child pornography was so limited and difficult 
to obtain prior to the advent of the Internet,
180
 pre–Internet possessors of 
child pornography had to expend significant effort in order to obtain 
images, and so presumably only those individuals with a serious interest in 
viewing children in sexual situations would undertake the effort and the 
risk necessary to obtain such images.
181
 Since the advent of the Internet, 
such images are far easier to obtain.
182
 Indeed, it appears that, while using 
the Internet, some possessors of child pornography initially view the 
images purely out of curiosity—and that some even stumble across links 
to the images accidentally.
183
 
Whether these individuals ultimately pose less of a risk of abusing a 
child than pre–Internet possessors is an empirical question that has yet to 
be answered. But current child pornography prosecutions suggest that at 
least some of these individuals do not collect images only of children
184
 
and are using the images to engage in sexual relationships with other 
adults.
185
 Such information casts doubt on the traditional account that 
―‗[c]hild pornography exists primarily for the consumption of paedophiles, 
and there is good cause to believe that if there were no paedophiles there 
would be little or no demand for child pornography.‘‖186 If individuals 
who are collecting child pornography are also collecting adult 
pornography or are using the images to arrange sexual encounters with 
other adults, then it is possible that these individuals view child 
pornography because they find it sexually exciting, but they are not 
 
 
 179. See, e.g., GELBER, supra note 40, at 15 (noting that at the same time the average sentence for 
possession of child pornography was rising, so too was the number of offenses). 
 180. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 181. Indeed, pre–Internet social science data suggests that child sex abusers traditionally obtained 
access to child pornography after already beginning to sexually abuse children. See supra text 
accompanying note 105. 
 182. See United States v. Ontiveros, No. 07-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *5–6 (E.D. Wis. July 
24, 2008). 
 183. O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
 184. E.g., Id. at 58 (describing an individual who possessed 495,000 images of child pornography 
in a personal electronic collection of 20 million total pornographic images). 
 185. E.g., United States v. Whited, 539 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing defendant‘s 
sharing of child pornography with another adult and their plan to arrange a sexual encounter between 
the two of them). 
 186. TATE, supra note 111, at 23 (attributing this statement to Scotland Yard). 
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interested in engaging in sexual acts with children.
187
 If legislatures 
determine that the Internet decreases the blameworthiness or risk profile of 
those who possess child pornography, then they should not only consider 
general reductions to the sentencing range for possession, but also 
consider abandoning computer-related enhancements, such as the Federal 
Sentencing Guideline that increases sentences for those defendants whose 
conduct ―involved the use of a computer.‖188  
As a fourth reform, legislatures should consider placing limits on how 
much a sentence may be increased based on the number of images an 
individual possesses.
189
 At present, Arizona seems to have the most 
problematic system, which increases a defendant‘s sentence by an 
additional mandatory consecutive ten-year term for each image.
190
 But 
other jurisdictions also provide significant sentencing increases for 
possessing multiple images.
191
 As O‘Donnell and Milner have explained: 
[T]he massive storage capacity of the average personal computer 
presents challenges in terms of assessing risk. Prior to the Internet, a 
large child pornography collection would have been indicative of an 
enthusiast of long-standing, somebody who devoted much time, 
effort and money to amassing his collection. But the Internet allows 
an individual to download a huge amount of material in a very short 
space of time. In other words, a collection of 5,000 images possibly 
reflects the quality of an individual‘s Internet connection rather than 
the effort they expended to painstakingly build a collection.
192
 
The ease of downloading images on the Internet may not only render the 
number of images an individual possesses a poor indicator of risk and 
blameworthiness, but also may result in sentences for mere possession that 
 
 
 187. See Ost, supra note 64, at 449 (―Certainly, it is possible that individuals use child 
pornography for sexual stimulation, yet have no inclination to actually go out and commit child 
abuse.‖). 
 188. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(6) (2009). The vast majority of federal 
defendants are subject to this enhancement. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, USE OF GUIDELINES, 
supra note 38, at 37 (reporting that 96.5% of federal defendants received this enhancement in 2008). 
The Commission itself has expressed concern about the appropriateness of the enhancement. See Ian 
N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The Road Here and the Road 
Ahead, 21 FED. SENT‘G REP. 83, 84 (2008) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING 
FEDERAL PENALTIES (1996)). 
 189. For a critique of the number-of-images enhancement under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, see Friedman & Supler, supra note 188. 
 190. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 23–25. 
 192. O‘DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
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are far longer than originally anticipated. It is difficult to believe, for 
example, that the Arizona state legislature intended for possessors of child 
pornography to spend decades longer in jail than those who sexually abuse 
children, yet that has occurred.
193
 Such absurd results could be avoided by 
placing absolute limits on the sentence that an individual can serve for the 
possession of child pornography.
194
  
Finally, legislatures that are considering any of the above reforms 
could choose to supplement any decrease in sentences for possessing child 
pornography with strict monitoring of those who have been convicted of 
possession. Such monitoring could help to identify any possessors of child 
pornography who genuinely pose a risk of sexually abusing a child, and 
could either help avoid that risk or lead to the prosecution and conviction 
of those individuals who actually abuse a child. Monitoring could include 
both close observation of the offender, perhaps including polygraph 
examinations,
195
 and interviews with those who have contact with the 
offender, in order to detect any suspicious behavior or inappropriate 
contact with children. This monitoring may also provide political cover for 
those legislators concerned about the possibility that their proposal to 
decrease sentences for child pornography possession could later be 
characterized as ―soft on crime.‖196 
B. Judicial Solutions 
Reform need not be limited to legislatures. As Part I amply 
demonstrates, most legislatures have elected to increase the penalties 
associated with possession of child pornography. This is presumably 
because child pornography and child sex abuse are politically disfavored 
offenses; there are powerful interest groups that favor increasing these 
sentences and few interest groups willing to oppose them. Thus, legislative 
reforms aimed at decreasing sentences for possession of child pornography 
are likely to occur slowly, if at all.
197
 
 
 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
 194. Indeed, the Second Circuit may have recently accomplished just that in the federal system by 
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2252 as prohibiting multiple counts of conviction for possession for a 
defendant with a single collection. See United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 155 (2d Cir. 2009); 
see also State v. Sutherby, 204 P.3d 916, 919–921 (Wash. 2009) (similar). 
 195. See generally Angela Kebric, Polygraph Testing in Sex Offender Treatment: A Constitutional 
and Essential Tool for Effective Treatment, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2009). 
 196. It is a well-accepted fact that ―appearing soft on crime is politically dangerous.‖ Barkow & 
O‘Neill, supra note 168, at 1982. 
 197. See id. at 1980–82 (noting that there are many powerful groups who favor harsher sentencing 
laws, and those who support more lenient sentences do not tend to possess much political power). 
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The judiciary can offset some of the legislative excesses identified 
above. Several judges have publicly announced their dissatisfaction with 
the severity of child pornography sentences,
198
 and some recent federal 
appellate decisions may result in systematically lower sentences for 
offenders. The Second Circuit, for example, recently construed a federal 
statute as prohibiting multiple possession counts of conviction for a 
defendant with a single collection.
199
 An opinion from the First Circuit 
recently stated that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for child 
pornography are ―harsher than necessary,‖200 clearly signaling to district 
court judges that it will affirm lower sentences for future child 
pornography defendants. And other circuit courts have noted that receipt 
and possession are identical offenses under the federal statute and have 
forbidden prosecutors from bringing both charges against an offender for 
the same images.
201
  
Sentencing judges are also able to mitigate the effects of harsh 
sentencing policies in individual cases. For example, in the federal system, 
sentences for possession of child pornography have steadily increased, in 
part because of various directives by Congress to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to make sentencing ranges for sex offenses more severe.
202
 
Recent Supreme Court decisions about a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment 
rights at sentencing permit federal district court judges to impose 
sentences that are lower than the range specified in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.
203
 District courts appear to have the most leeway to sentence 
below the Guideline range when there are case-specific facts or 
characteristics of the particular defendant that the district court can 
identify as warranting a less severe sentence.
204
 The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are meant to apply to ―typical offenders.‖205 There is ample 
 
 
 198. See, e.g., Dan Herbeck, Sentencing Guidelines May Undergo Revision, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 
6, 2009, at A2; Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession of Child Porn May Be Too High, Judges Say, 
NAT‘L L.J., Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202433693658. 
 199. See Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155. 
 200. United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 97 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 201. See United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Miller, 
527 F.3d 54, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 202. See United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM‘N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 72–73 
(2004)); see also STABENOW, supra note 20, at 15. 
 203. E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 204. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596–98 (2007); see also United States v. 
Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that a non–Guidelines sentence imposed because 
of ―the special conditions of a particular offender‖ is not subject to ―closer review‖). 
 205. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996) (noting that a trial court is permitted to 
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legislative history that Congress (erroneously) assumed that a ―typical‖ 
child pornography possessor is largely indistinguishable from an offender 
who has already sexually abused a child or who poses a substantial risk of 
doing so.
206
 Thus, one could argue that only those possessors of child 
pornography who have committed a contact offense or who pose a 
significant risk of committing one in the future should receive the full 
sentence for possession under the Federal Guidelines. Offenders who 
appear not to pose such a risk ought to be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment that is below the advisory guideline range. 
When individualizing sentences, judges often have the ability to 
maintain a distinction between possession of child pornography and child 
sex abuse. They should, as a matter of course, impose shorter sentences on 
those offenders who have no prior contact convictions or arrests and 
whose presentence interviews with probation officers reveal no other signs 
of risk. A number of courts across the country appear to be engaging in 
exactly this sort of risk assessment and imposing lower sentences on those 
pornography offenders whom the courts conclude pose no risk of contact 
offending.
207
 
CONCLUSION 
Those who support the modern trend of increased sentences by 
conflating possession of child pornography with child sex abuse would 
likely dismiss many of the arguments in this Article. The lack of empirical 
support for a link between possession of child pornography and child sex 
abuse does not, in their view, suggest that lengthening sentences for 
 
 
sentence outside of the Guideline range when ―certain aspects of the case [are] . . . unusual enough for 
it to fall outside the heartland of cases‖). 
 206. See supra notes 44, 67, 68, 118, 120. 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); United 
States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1110 (N.D. Iowa 2009); United States v. Grober, 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 382, 404 (D.N.J. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004–05 (S.D. Iowa 
2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011–12 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. 
Grinbergs, No. 8:05CR232, 2008 WL 4191145, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 8, 2008); United States v. 
Ontiveros, No. 07-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539, at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2008); see also Amir Efrati, 
Judges Trim Jail Time for Child Porn, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A2 (describing cases); Hansen, 
supra note 40 (same). Perhaps even more noteworthy is a recent Second Circuit decision vacating a 
lengthy sentence for possession of child pornography: the district court had premised the lengthy 
sentence on a conclusion that the defendant was a ―pedophile,‖ a conclusion that the appellate court 
found to be unsubstantiated. United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2010). Cf. United 
States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing sentence where district court had based its 
sentencing in child pornography case, at least in part, on whether defendant posed a future risk of 
pedophilia, but had failed to subpoena psychologist who had treated defendant and who would have 
testified favorably about defendant‘s response to treatment).  
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possession is improper; rather, they see it as an obligation of those who 
would have shorter sentences to demonstrate that there is no link.
208
 
Because the crime of child sex abuse is so terrible, and because longer 
sentences might promote public safety, those who support the modern 
trend have a very appealing and emotionally powerful argument in favor 
of modern sentencing severity.
209
 
These broad claims of public safety and the horror of child sex abuse 
are dangerous tools in the public discussion about sentencing severity. 
Some dark moments in U.S. history—such as the Japanese internment 
camps,
210
 McCarthyism,
211
 and the recent torture of terror suspects
212—can 
be traced to arguments that also relied on claims of public safety threats. 
We are now imprisoning individuals who possess child pornography for 
up to two hundred years on the theory that they pose a risk of committing 
contact offenses. Those who want to impose sentences well above what is 
imposed for serious violent crimes, including second-degree murder and 
kidnapping, should bear the political burden of demonstrating that there is 
a verifiable risk before we equate possession of child pornography with 
child sex abuse. Equating the possession of images with contact offenses 
not only raises concerns about proportionality and due process, but such 
conflation can also lead to misperceptions about who commits contact 
offenses and about the effectiveness of law enforcement in detecting and 
 
 
 208. See, e.g., GELBER, supra note 40, at 6 (arguing that one cannot claim those who possess child 
pornography pose no threat of physical harm to children because ―there is no published research on the 
odds that viewers of child porn will actually assault a child‖ and noting that the ―lack of definitive 
information does not stop . . . countless defendants from repeatedly making the self-serving argument 
that they are not a threat to children‖). Complicating this matter is the fact that the Supreme Court in 
Osborne appears to have assumed that this empirical support exists. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 
111 n.7 (1990). Whether there is a relationship between possession of child pornography and child sex 
abuse is undoubtedly a legislative (rather than adjudicative) fact. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An 
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 
(1942). However, if Supreme Court dicta about such a relationship appeared in the decision that 
permits states to criminalize the personal possession of child pornography, then it seems all the less 
likely that legislators, who are politically accountable, are likely to revisit such an unpopular issue. 
 209. Indeed, in making that argument, supporters will often devote significant time and energy 
describing the horrible sex acts portrayed in various images found in the collections of those convicted 
for possessing child pornography. See, e.g., GELBER, supra note 40, at 1–2; WOLAK ET AL., supra note 
70, at 27. After listening to descriptions of such images, it is difficult to attempt to engage in a 
reasoned discussion about whether criminal penalties have become too high without sounding rather 
heartless. 
 210. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–20 (1944). 
 211. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Max Rosenn, Presumed Guilty, 56 
U. PITT. L. REV. 535, 537 (1995). 
 212. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45; 
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1436–40 (2005). 
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prosecuting contact offenses. Those misperceptions may, in turn, 
adversely affect the rates of child sex abuse offenses. 
I do not underestimate the disgust that possessors of child pornography 
inspire, nor the political forces allied against them. I do not suggest that 
legislatures legalize the possession of child pornography. Nor do I 
advocate a return to the days when the offense was classified as a 
misdemeanor and punished only with nominal sentences. Nonetheless, the 
modern trend in sentencing for child pornography possession has reached 
a point that seems absurd. The modest reforms I suggest in Part IV would 
help to curb the worst excesses of the modern trend. And, most 
importantly, they would help to maintain the distinction between 
possession of child pornography and child sex abuse. 
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